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Comments
Public Sector Interest Arbitration: Threat
to Local Representative Government?
The incidence of strikes by public employees in recent years has increased
concomitantly with the political power of public employee groups. Al-
though criticized as an impermissible infringement on governmental author-
ity,' public employee strikes are presently tolerated in many communities.
Certain strikes, however, particularly those by essential safety employees,
are intolerable, and their occurrence subjects the community to serious
health and economic dangers. Unable to effectively avert these strikes,
many states require that bargaining impasses between the public employer
and its essential employees be submitted for a binding resolution by private
citizen arbitrators. Interest arbitration, although seldom used in the private
sector,2 has mustered an impressive record for avoiding public employee
strikes.
The arbitration process, however, presents a serious conflict with our
representative form of local government because it places in the hands of
private citizen arbitrators important policymaking powers that traditionally
are reserved for elected officials. In order to resolve a dispute a private
citizen arbitrator is often called upon to direct increases in municipal
expenditures, and not infrequently, to formulate important portions of com-
munity social policy. Unlike the elected legislators who normally make
these types of decisions, however, the private citizen arbitrator is not
1. The now antiquated philosophy that strikes by public employees are tantamount to
mutiny against the sovereignty of governmental authority was most notably espoused by
President Wilson in his reaction to the Boston police strike: "[I]t is not within the province of
the trade union movement to especially organize policemen, no more than to organize
militiamen, as both policemen and militiamen are often controlled by forces inimical to the
labor movement." PROCEEDINGS, AFL CONVENTION 35 (1897). See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v.
Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 276, 83 A.2d 482, 485 (1951); Vogel, What About the Rights of
the Public Employee?, I LAB. L.J. 612 (1950). See generally Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsory
Public-Sector Bargaining, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 25 (1974),
2. See Morris, The Role of Interest Arbitration in a Collective Bargaining System, I
INDUS. REL. L.J. 427, 427-32 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Morris).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 9
politically accountable to a constituency. One arbitrator, who dissented in
an early arbitration award, described the essence of the problem when he
asked, "Who elected the arbitration panel of which I am a part? To whom is
this panel responsive? What pressures can the citizens. . . bring to bear on
the panel? How do they express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the
decision? ' 3 The concern expressed by this arbitrator, that policymaking
should be left in the hands of politically accountable officials, provides the
impetus for this comment. Prior to detailing the scope of this problem, it is
necessary to review some basic concepts.
When the representatives of a public employee organization 4 and of a
public employer5 meet to negotiate6 the terms of a memorandum of agree-
ment, 7 the parties will frequently be unable to reach agreement on certain
terms. When further negotiations appear futile, the parties typically attempt
other techniques to resolve the dispute.8 In the private sector, the employees
3. Dissenting opinion of Arbitrator Jenner in City of Marquette v. Marquette Police Local
(unpublished, Mar. 26, 1970) quoted in Rehmus, Legislated Interest Arbitration in INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS RESEARCH Ass'N SERIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL WINTER
MEETING 307, 308 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rehmus].
4. Public employees in California are granted the right to organize and to exclusive
representation during negotiations with the public employer. These rights are provided to state
employees, CAL. GOV'T CODE §3515.5; to local employees, CAL. GOV'T CODE §3503; and to
public school employees, CAL. GOV'T CODE §3540. This comment will focus on the Meyers-
Milias-Brown Act [hereinafter referred to as the MMB Act], CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-3511,
which governs municipal labor relations. Government Code Section 3501(a) defines an "em-
ployee organization" as "any organization which includes employees of a public agency and
which has as one of its primary purposes representing such employees in their relations with
that public agency." A "public employee" is defined as:
[A]ny person employed by any public agency, including employees of the fire
departments and fire services of counties, cities, cities and counties, districts, and
other political subdivisions of the state, excepting those persons elected by popular
vote or appointed by the governor of this state.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §3501(d).
5. Government Code Section 3501(c) defines "public agency," which is used by this
comment interchangeably with "public employer" as:
[E]very governmental subdivision, every district, every public and quasi-public cor-
poration, every public agency and public service corporation and every town, city,
county, city and county and municipal corporation, whether incorporated or not and
whether chartered or not.
This definition does not include "a school district or a county board of education ... " CAL.
GOV'T CODE §3501(c).
6. The terms "negotiation" and "bargaining" are used interchangeably by this comment
to identify the procedure whereby the representatives of the public agency and the employee
organization representing an employee unit "meet and confer in good faith" over wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment. These parties have "the mutual obligation
personally to meet and confer promptly upon request by either party and continue for a
reasonable period of time in order to exchange freely information, opinions, and proposals, and
to endeavor to reach agreement on matters within the scope of representation . CAL.
GOV'T CODE §3505.
7. A "memorandum of agreement" is used interchangeably by this comment with
"memorandum of understanding." The legal significance of a memorandum of agreement is
similar to a private sector collective bargaining agreement. See Glendale City Emp. Ass'n v.
City of Glendale, 15 Cal. 3d 328, 339-40,540 P.2d 609,616-17, 124 Cal. Rptr. 513,520-21(1975).
Once the parties reach agreement and it is approved by the public agency, the agreement
becomes binding on both parties, id. at 336,540 P.2d at 614, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 518, and it may be
enforced by writ of mandamus, see id. at 344, 540 P.2d at 620, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
8. The term "dispute" is used interchangeably herein with the term "impasse." A
dispute, or impasse, is a condition in which the parties, after negotiating in good faith about
matters within the scope of negotiation, are unable to reach agreement, and further negotiations
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are permitted to apply economic pressure on the employer through work
stoppages in order to break the bargaining deadlock. 9 In the public sector,
however, strikes are generally unlawful. 10 Nevertheless, public employee
strikes are occurring with increasing frequency." The demand for local
governmental services is generally inelastic 12 and does not produce income.
appear futile. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §3540.1(f). An "interest" impasse or dispute concerns
matters to be included in a new agreement. On the other hand, a "grievance" or "rights"
impasse or dispute relates to a disagreement about an interpretation of provisions in an already
existing agreement. Similarly, there are two forms of arbitration: interest and grievance arbitra-
tion. This comment is only concerned with interest arbitration. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW (1976).
9. Under the National Labor Relations. Act, concerted employee activities, such as
strikes for higher wages, are protected. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345
(1938); 29 U.S.C. §157 (1970). The employer may also employ economic pressure, for example
by a lockout. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965).
10. The majority of states prohibit public employee strikes by either statute, e.g., DEL.
CODE tit. 19, §1312; KAN. STAT. §75-4333(c)(5), or by case law, e.g., Anderson Fed. of Teachers
Local 519 v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 560, 254 N.E.2d 329, 330 (1970); Jefferson
County Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 463 S.W. 2d 627 (Ky. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
865 (1971). Seven states have right to strike legislation. ALASKA STAT. §23.40.200 (1972)
(permitted for semi-essential and nonessential employees but prohibited for essential employ-
ees); HAW. REV. STAT. §89-12 (Supp. 1975) (not permitted when health or safety is endangered);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §179.64 (Supp. 1976) (strike prohibited except where employer refuses to
comply with arbitration award); MONT. REV. CODES ANN, §41-2209 (Supp. 1975) (permitted for
nurses); OR. REV. STAT. §243.726 (1975) (permitted after impasse procedures, such as media-
tion, are exhausted); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1975) (permitted after
exhaustion of impasse procedures unless strike creates a clear and present danger to public's
health, safety or welfare). The common law rule, adopted by California courts, is that strikes by
public employees are unlawful in the absence of express legislative authorization. E.g., City of
San Diego v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Emps., 8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 310-11, 87
Cal. Rptr. 258, 259-60 (1970); Almond v. County of Sacramento, 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 36-37, 80
Cal. Rptr. 518, 521 (1969). The issue is not yet settled, however. Los Angeles County Civil
Serv. Comm'n v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 126, 130 (1977) (hearing granted by supreme
court, L.A. 30878). Only strikes by firefighters are outlawed by statute. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1962.
An agreement induced by a strike, however, is fully enforceable against the public employer.
City & County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898, 918, 534 P.2d 403, 416, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 707, 720 (1975). See also Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n,
426 U.S. 482 (1976).
1I. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the number of strikes by government
employees rose from 384 in 1974 to a record high of 478 in 1975, of which 446 were by local
employees. Strikes over wage increase demands accounted for 52.1 percent of all work
stoppages in 1975. [19771 694 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 18-23.
12. "Elasticity" is an economic concept devised to measure the responsiveness of con-
sumer demand for a product or service tq- a change in price for the product or service. If
demand is "elastic," an increase in pricevill result in a decrease in demand. Conversely, an
"inelastic" demand is one in which a price increase will not result in a corresponding decrease
in demand. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 364 (7th ed. 1967). The elasticity of the demand for
goods or services and the corresponding demand for labor creates market forces that constrain
the power of unions to force the level of wages kip in the private sector. This "wage-
employment trade-off," which tends to influence union wage demands in the private sector, is
not generally present in the public sector. Thus, public sector unions are not as sensitive to a
potential decrease in demand for labor, which results from increased wages, as are their private
sector counterparts. Three reasons are advanced for this difference between the private and
public sectors: (1) government normally holds a monopoly on the provision of public services,
for example, fire and police protection; (2) the demand for government services is more
inelastic than is the demand for private goods or services since there are few, if any, acceptable
alternative sources for government services available to the taxpayer; and (3) arguably, public
services are more essential than are most private goods and services. L.G. REYNOLDS, LABOR
ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS, 676-77 (6th ed. 1974). Further, most public services are
financed entirely by tax revenues, while private goods and services are dependent on income
produced from sales. When labor costs increase causing the price for private goods or services
to increase, the consumer demand for private goods and services will normally drop. In the
public sector, however, when the tax rate (price) goes up, the demand for the government
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 9
Therefore, unlike strikes in the private sector, a public employee work
stoppage does not create economic pressure. 13 Many governmental services
are, however, essential to the health and safety of the citizens, and when
these services are withheld, the public employer is subjected to political
pressure from the community to capitulate to employee demands.14 In an
effort to avoid the interruption of essential services, most states either
authorize or require submission of interest disputes to binding arbitration. 15
Under a system of interest arbitration the arbitrator determines the terms of
the parties' agreement, unlike grievance arbitration in which the arbitrator
interprets the terms of an already existing agreement.
The California Legislature has not yet enacted legislation that either
authorizes or mandates interest arbitration.' 6 The increased occurrence of
services remains the same. Although the demand for most public services is inelastic, in that the
taxpayer will continue to finance the service as the cost escalates, there are a variety of
constraints on tax increases: the natural resistance of taxpayers; the political sensitivity of
elected officials, interested in reelection, to the potential voter response to increased taxes; the
community leaders' fear of losing business and employment to other cities or states; and
occasional constitutional restrictions on tax increases by cities and states. ld. Some of the local
spending restrictions are statutorily imposed by the state government. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§53732, 53733; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §141.45 (Supp. 1975). See Wellington & Winter, The
Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1120 (1969).
13. It could be maintained that certain employee strikes are welcomed by the local
legislative body. Certain services are nonessential and the absence of these services can be
tolerated by the community. A strike, thus, can result in a significant payroll savings and cause
minimal political pressure from the community to resolve the negotiation impasse.
14. Professors Wellington and Winter argue that public employee strikes distort the
political process by placing too much power, relative to other interest groups, in the hands of
public employee unions. "This distortion therefore may result in a redistribution of income by
government, whereby union members are subsidized at the expense of other interest groups."
H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 167 (1971). These authors suggest
that even without the strike weapon, public employee unions wield political power that is
disproportionate to the size of their membership. The use of the strike significantly increases
their political power; thus, in the public sector, the strike can be regarded as a "political
weapon," unlike the private sector, where it is an "economic weapon." See id. at 168-69.
15. Most states that provide for interest arbitration require the parties to submit to
arbitration within a specified amount of time after reaching a bargaining impasse. ALASKA
STAT. §23.40.200 (1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§7-472, -473 (Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§90.1-.4 (West Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, §§965(3)-(4), 979-D(3)-(4); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, §8 (West Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS §423.233 (Supp. 1976); MINN.
STAT. §179.69 subd. 3 (Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. §48-810 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. §288.200
(1975); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§205-205.9, 207-207.17 (McKinney Supp. 1975); OR. REV. STAT,
§§243.742-.762 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§217.4, 2101.804 (Purdon Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §36-11-9 (Supp. 1975) §§28-9.l-7, .2-7, .3-9, .4-10 (1969); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. §9-14A-
2 (Supp. 1975) (declared unconstitutional in City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters Local
814, - S.D. -, 234 N.W.2d 35 (1975)); UTAH CODE ANN. §34-20a-7 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §41.56.450 (Supp. 1975); WIS. STAT. ANN. §111.77(3) (1974); Wyo. STAT. §27-269
(1967).
In other states that provide for arbitration, however,submission to the arbitration process
is not mandatory. DEL. CODE tit. 19, §1310 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. §89-I 1(b)(3) (Supp. 1974);
IND. CODE ANN. §§22-6-4-9, 22-6-4-11 (Burns Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §59-1614(9)
(Supp." 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §273-A:12 (1975); N.J. REV. STAT. §34:13A-7 (1975);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 1, §548.7 (West Supp. 1976-77); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-
1, §10 (Vernon Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1733 (Supp. 1977).
16. Numerous bills providing for interest arbitration have come before the California
legislature in recent years. See note 20 infra. Attempts to provide for mandatory interest
arbitration as well as attempts to prohibit it by constitutional amendment were afoot at
publication time. A Senate Constitutional Amendment was introduced on June 24, 1977, to
provide for arbitration, SCA 50, 1977-78 Regular Session, and a statewide drive to place an
initiative on the ballot prohibiting arbitration was underway, Harrison, Election Sought on
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strikes by essential public employees 17 with its attendant political impact, 18
as well as the apparent effectiveness of arbitration in other states, 19 suggests
that such legislation will be forthcoming. The legislature has considered
twenty-three proposals for binding arbitration during the past fourteen
years. 20 The most recent proposal21 was defeated on the senate floor22 after
Strike Ban, San Diego Union, July 6, 1977, §A, at 1, col. 2. Presently, three California charter
cities provide for binding arbitration. HAYWARD, CAL. CHARTER §809, CAL. STATS. 1975,
charter c. 28 at 116-18; VALLEJO, CAL. CHARTER §810, CAL. STATS. 1970, res. c. 183, at 3773;
OAKLAND, CAL. CHARTER §810, CAL. STATS. 1973 res. c. 52, at 3080. The arbitration provision
in San Francisco, Cal., S.F. Adm. Code §16.21(c), (d) (1974) ([1974] RF-40 Gov'T EMPL. REL.
REP. (BNA) 51:4165, was ruled an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the California
Court of Appeal. San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City & County of San Francisco, 68
Cal. App. 3d 896, 901, 137 Cal. Rptr. 607, 609 (1977). For an example of the California
Legislature's study of arbitration see CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY, FINAL REPORT OF THE
ASSE BLY ADVISORY COUNCIL ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 194-240 (Mar. 15, 1973). See
also Comment, California Assembly Advisory Council's Recommendations on Impasse Resolu-
tion Procedures and Public Employee Strikes, I1 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 473 (1974).
17. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the number of days idle due to strikes by
protective services nationwide increased from 14,200, days in 1974 to 29,100 days in 1975 with
an increase in the total number of workers involved in the strike activities from 3,400 workers in
1974 to 6,100 in 1975. Protective services include police and firefighter personnel. [1977] 694
GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 22. But see Cebulski, A 1975-76 Tabulation of Strikes in
California's Public Sector, 33 CAL. PUB. EMP. REL. 2,6-7 (1977). This study indicates that there
were no strikes by safety services during 1976 in California, compared with eight such strikes in
1975. There were, however, numerous sick-ins and slowdowns by safety employees. See H.
Polland, The Need for Interest Arbitration for California's Public Safety Employees 29 (1977)
(unpublished paper on file at Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Polland]. For a
discussion of the distinction between essential (such as the safety services) and nonessential
employees, see text accompanying notes 176-189 infra.
18. See note 14 supra. The political repercussions from the August 1975 strike by police
and firefighter personnel in San Francisco are illustrative. For a summary of the events
surrounding this strike see Bowen, Two Case Studies-Facts and Issues, 27 CAL. PUB. EMP.
REL. 19 (1975). The San Francisco strike was settled by the mayor under his emergency powers.
The settlement was upheld by the courts after numerous suits were brought. E.g., Crowley v.
City & County of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 450, 461-62, 134 Cal. Rptr. 533, 539 (1976);
Verreos v. City & County of San Francisco, 63 Cal. App. 3d 86, 109, 133 Cal. Rptr. 649, 663
(1976). The San Francisco electorate demonstrated its disdain for the striking police and
firefighters at the polls in November 1976 when it adopted several initiative measures
designed to deter public employee strikes. For a description of these measures, see [1976] 683
GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-14; Taylor, Solving Employee Relations Problems by Charter
Amendment: A New Legal Quandry?, 30 CAL. PUB. EMP. REL. 10, 10-12 (1976). One of the
measures enacted in November 1975, which required police and firefighter personnel to take an
oath that he or she will not engage in strike action against the city, was declared unconstitution-
al. San Francisco Police Officers Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco, 69 Cal. App. 3d
1019, 1025, 138 Cal. Rptr. 755, 758 (1977).
19. It appears that the most reliable indicator of the effectiveness of arbitration to avoid
strikes is to examine the frequency of strikes in a state both before and after its arbitration
statute was enacted. On this basis, there can be no argument.that arbitration is successful. For
example, during the 39 months of conventional arbitration in Michigan there were no strikes by
firefighters and "only a few by police. All but one of these were of short duration and only one
against an arbitration award." J. STERN, C. REHMUS, J. LOEWENBERG, H. KASPER & B. DENNIS,
FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION 71 (1975) [hereinafter cited as J. STERN]. Since final-offer arbitra-
tion was adopted, there have been no strikes, work stoppages or significant job actions by
public safety employees. Id. There have not been any strikes by either police or firefighters in
Pennsylvania since 1968 when the arbitration statute was enacted. Id. at 32. There have been no
strikes by safety personnel since the enactment of arbitration statutes in Alaska (1972), Connec-
ticut (1975), Iowa (1974), Maine (1974), Massachusetts (1973), Minnesota (1972), Nebraska
(1969), Nevada (binding fact-finding 1975), New York (1974), Oregon (1973), Rhode Island
(1967), Utah (1975), Washington (1973), and Wyoming (1965). Polland, supra note 17, at 48.
20. The California Legislature has previously considered, but rejected, 23 bills that
proposed arbitration of public employee disputes. SB 164, 1977-78 Regular Session; SB 4, 275,
1294, 1310, 1975-76 Regular Session; AB 86, 119, 1724, 1781, 1975-76 Regular Session; SB 32,
1973-74 Regular Session; AB 33, 1243, 3666, 1973-74 Regular Session; SB 1424, 1440, 1972
Regular Session; SB 333, 1971 Regular Session; AB 98, 1970 Regular Session; SB 1293, 1294,
1970 Regular Session; AB 1400, 1969 Regular Session; AB 1935, 1967 Regular Session; AB
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a heated debate that focused on the political impact of a state mandate for
arbitration on local governments.
23
Numerous arguments have been made about the vices and virtues of
interest arbitration in the public sector. 24 Proponents of arbitration regard it
as merely an extension of the negotiation process, and defend it by pointing
to its ability to resolve bargaining deadlocks while avoiding strikes.25 The
opponents claim that the arbitration process effectively removes decision-
making from the hands of elected officials, thereby insulating the govern-
ment from the governed. 26 To date, all but three of the twelve state high
courts that have considered the constitutionality of an interest arbitration law
have held it valid. 27 Two of the decisions upholding arbitration were,
2500, 3084, 1963 Regular Session. See Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach, 18 Cal. 3d 22, 26,553
P.2d 1140, 1142, 132 Cal. Rptr. 668, 670 (1976). Justice Mosk, dissenting, argued that 22
defeated bills does not represent legislative opposition toward binding arbitration. He states
"[In] these circumstances, even the Oracle of Delphi would have difficulty in finding legislative
hostility to local use of arbitration." 18 Cal. 3d at 30, 553 P.2d at 1145, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
21. SB 164, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, June 22, 1977, provided for mandatory
binding issue-by-issue final-offer arbitration of interest disputes between local governments
and its safety employees and for the imposition of stringent penalties on striking employees.
22. JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE at 3913 (1977-78 Reg. Sess.). The vote was 16 in
favor; 21 opposed.
23. The June 23, 1977, debate on the senate floor, which was witnessed by the author, saw
numerous senators vehemently argue their respective positions. The principal criticism of the
bill was that it would remove decisionmaking from the hands of locally elected officials. For an
example of the type of arguments echoed by the legislators, both for and against arbitration, see
Interim Hearing Before the California Senate Subcommittee on Local Public Employment
Practices, Sept. 30, 1976, at 72 (pro arbitration statement of Brian L. Hatch, Federated Fire
Fighters of California, AFL-CIO); id. at 145 (statement of Michael J. Arnold, Legislative
Representative, League of California Cities, against arbitration); see Arnold,-The Case Against
Compulsory Interest Arbitration, 33 CAL. PUB. EMP. REL. 32 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Arnold]; Davis & Reno, The Casefor Compulsory InterestArbitration, 33 CAL. PUB. EMP. REL.
21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Davis & Reno].
24. See, e.g., Howlett, Contract Negotiation Arbitration in the Public Sector, 42 U. CIN.
L. REV. 47 (1973); McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the
Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM,. L. REV. 1192 (1972).
25. Grodin, Political Aspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, I INDUS. REL. L.J. I,
17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Grodin]; Davis & Reno, supra note 23.
26. Arnold, supra note 23 at 33.
27. Valid: City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973); Town
of Arlington v. Board of Concil. and Arb., - Mass. -, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976); Dearborn Fire
Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975); School Dist. of
Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972); City of Amsterdam
v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa.
183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969); City of Warwick v. Regular Fireman's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d
206 (1969); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, - Wash. 2d -, 553 P.2d 1316 (1976);
State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968). Invalid: City
of Aurora v. Aurora Firefighters Prot. Ass'n, - Colo. -, 566 P.2d 1356 (1977); Greeley Police
Union v. City Council, - Colo. -, 553 P.2d 790 (1976); City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls
Firefighters Local 814, - S.D. -, 234 N.W.2d 35 (1975); Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n
of Firefighters, - Utah -, 563 P.2d 786 (1977). Other state courts have also examined these or
related issues. Maryland Classified Emp. Ass'n v. Anderson, (Md. Cir. Ct. Case No. 1178 Oct.
18, 1976) (discussed in [1976] 687 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) B-15) (arbitration law invalid);
Midwest City v. Cravens, 532 P.2d 829 (Okla. 1975) (arbitration law is matter of statewide
concern); City of Hermiston v. Employment Rel. Bd., - Or. App. -, 557 P.2d 681 (1976)
(public employee relations, including arbitration is a municipal affair). See also NLRB v.
Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 252, 543 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1976);
Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Edtic., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); Board of
Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Local 1600, 62 Ill. 2d 470, 343 N.E.2d 473 (1976);
Mugford v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945); Fairview
Hosp. Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Ser. & Hosp. Emp. Local 113,241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954);
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however, reached by equally divided courts. 28 Three principal attacks have
been leveled at compulsory arbitration in the courts. First is the claim that a
state lacks the power to mandate arbitration of charter city29 employee
disputes because, unlike a general law city,30 a charter city is constitutional-
ly immune from state legislation that concerns its "municipal affairs." 31
The difficult, and still unresolved, task of the courts is to determine whether
City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239,206 S.W.2d 539 (1947); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v.
Communication Workers, 5 N.J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950); Local 1226, American Fed'n of State,
County & Muni. Emps. v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis. 2d 209, 151 N.W.2d 30 (1967).
28. City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973); Dearborn
Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975). The justices
in each case were equally divided, thereby affirming the lower court's finding that the arbitra-
tion law was valid.
29. A California city may become a "charter city" by majority vote of its electors. Once
the city charter is adopted, it becomes effective when filed with the Secretary of State. CAL.
CONST. art. XI, §3(a). As a consequence of the enactment of this charter, a city acquires its
"home rule" powers to "make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to
municipal affairs." CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5(a). For a general discussion of home rule, see S.
SATO & A. VAN ALSrYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 216-36 (1970).
30. While a charter city derives its power to govern its municipal affairs from the
constitution, CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5, a general law city derives this power from the legislature,
see CAL. GOV'T CODE §§34300-45345. The constitution grants all cities and counties, however,
the power to "make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances
and regulations not in conflict with general laws." CAL. CONST. art. XI, §7. This power must be
distinguished from the power over municipal affairs which is only constitutionally granted to
charter cities. See Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1094-98
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Sato]. The main advantage enjoyed by chartered cities is that the
exercise of local authority is not restricted as it is for general law cities. The California
Legislature, however, has been generous with general law cities and there are few powers
enjoyed by chartered cities that have not been granted to general law cities. Further, the
municipal affairs doctrine appears to be narrowing as the courts are defining fewer matters as
municipal affairs. See LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, CHARTER OR GENERAL LAW CITY? 6
(1971) [hereinafter cited as LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES].
31. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5. Professor Sato describes the immunity as the protective
function of the municipal affairs doctrine. Sato, supra note 30, at 1060. For a discussion of the
evolution of the municipal affairs doctrine in California, see Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in
California 1, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1941). See note 124 infra. Reference to municipal affairs is
made in CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5 which provides:
(a) It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city governed
thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to
municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided in their several
charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general laws. City
charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any existing charter,
and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.
(b) It shall be competent in all city charters to provide, in addition to those
provisions allowable by this Constitution, and by the laws of the State for: (1) the
constitution, regulation, and government of the city police force (2) subgovernment
in all or part of a city (3) conduct of city elections and (4) plenary authority is hereby
granted, subject only to the restrictions of this article, to provide therein or by
amendment thereto, the manner in which, the method by which, the times at which,
and the terms for which the several municipal officers and employees whose compen-
sation is paid by the city shall be elected or appointed, and for their removal, and for
their compensations, and for the number of deputies, clerks and other employees that
each shall have, and for the compensation, method of appointment, qualifications,
tenure of office and removal of such deputies, clerks and other employees.
For examples of cases attacking arbitration as a violation of "home rule" powers, see Town
of Arlington v. Board of Concil. and Arb., - Mass. -, -, 352 N.E.2d 914,918 (1976); City of
Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 26-27, 332 N.E.2d 290, 292-93, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 407
(1975); State ex. rel. Firefighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 300 (Wyo. 1968).
Cf. Midwest City v. Cravens, 532 P.2d 829, 834 (Okla. 1975) (grievance arbitration for fire-
fighters and police is statewide affair); City of Hermiston v. Employment Rel. Bd., -Or. App.
-, -, 557 P.2d 681, 685-86 (1976) (public employee relations act is not binding on charter
cities); Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, - Utah -, -, 563 P.2d 786, 789
(1977) (state legislature's withdrawal of local control over wages of firefighters and police does
not interfere with municipal function).
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a state mandate32-for public sector interest arbitration constitutes a matter of
statewide concern 33 or a municipal affair.14 The second attack rests on the
doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power. 35 The argument is
32. Unlike voluntary interest arbitration, a system of mandatory or compulsory interest
arbitration, upon which this comment will focus, requires that the parties submit their dispute to
the arbitral tribunal if it is unresolved after a statutorily prescribed period. E.g., IOWA CODE
ANN. §20.22 (West Supp. 1976); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §209.4 (McKinney Supp. 1975); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §111.77(3) (West 1974). Under a system of voluntary interest arbitration, the state
does not direct that disputes be submitted to arbitration, rather the parties are free to request
binding arbitration during negotiations under a state arbitration plan. E.g., ALASKA STAT.
§23.40.200 (1972); N.J. REV. STAT. §34:13A-7 (1965). Alternatively, the state does not provide
for arbitration, thereby permitting each municipality independently to adopt and administer an
arbitration plan. See Morris, supra note 2 at 459. But see Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach,
18 Cal. 3d 22, 26, 553 P.2d 1140, 1143, 132 Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 (1976) (a California general law
city is not permitted to enact an interest arbitration plan). SB 164, 1977-78 Regular Session, as
amended, June 22, 1977, contained a "local option" provision permitting the voters of a
community to render the proposed compulsory arbitration law inapplicable to the municipality.
See notes 20-23 supra.
33. In Bishop v. City of San Jose, I Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969), the
California Supreme Court attempted to shed some light on the meaning of "statewide con-
cern." The court stated:
As to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities
remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the
provisions of their charters, if it is the intent and purpose of such general laws to
occupy the field to the exclusion of municipal regulation (the preemption doc-
trine). . . .[L]ocal governments (whether chartered or not) do not lack the power,
nor are they forbidden by the Constitution, to legislate upon matters which are not of
a local nature; nor is the Legislature forbidden to legislate with respect to the local
municipal affairs of a home rule municipality. Instead, in the event of conflict
between the regulations of state and of local governments, or if the state legislation
discloses an intent to preempt the field to the exclusion of local regulation, the
question becomes one of predominance or superiority as between general state laws
on the one hand and the local regulations on the other. . . .What may at one time
have been a matter of local concern may at a later time become a matter of state
concern controlled by the general laws of the state.
Id. at 61-63, 460 P.2d at 140-41, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 468-69.
34. The determination of what constitutes a municipal affair will not be resolved by the
legislature, but by the courts, id. at 63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469, on a case-by-case
basis, Butterworth v. Boyd, 12 Cal. 2d 140, 147, 82 P.2d 434, 438 (1938). See note 31 supra and
text accompanying notes 122-126 infra.
35. The California Supreme Court stated in Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal. 2d 371, 445 P.2d
303, 71 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1968), that "the purpose of the doctrine that legislative power cannot be
delegated is to assure that 'truly fundamental issues will be resolved by the Legislature' and that
a 'grant of authority [is]. . .accompanied by safeguards to prevent its abuse."' Id. at 376, 445
P.2d at 306, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 690. Professor Freund, the first American master of this subject,
wrote in 1928:
While it is extremely difficult to formulate a generally valid principle of legitimacy
of delegation, the observation may be hazarded, that with regard to major matters the
appropriate sphere of delegated authority is where there are no controverted issues of
policy or of opinion.
E. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 218 (1928). In 1976,
Professor Grodin wrote:
Nondelegation doctrine is an unusually murky area of constitutional law. At its core
is the notion that the power of legislatures to insulate policymaking from ultimate
political control must have some limits. Courts have never developed meaningful
criteria for the imposition of those limits, however, and their inability to do so
reflects both the complexity of modern government and the reluctance, at least in
recent decades, of the judiciary to intrude too deeply into legislative discretion in the
structuring of the decisionmaking process.
Grodin, supra note 25, at 6. Professor Davis flatly states, "The non-delegation doctrine has
failed." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §2.01 (1972). Nevertheless, courts have serious-
ly considered attacks leveled at arbitration laws founded on the nondelegation doctrine. E.g.,
Greeley Police Union v. City Council, - Colo. -, -, 553 P.2d 790, 792 (1976); City of
Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 398 (Me. 1973); Dearborn Fire Fighters
Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 246, 231 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1975).
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that certain decisionmaking powers which are vested with the local legisla-
tive body may not be delegated to an arbitrator. 36 This argument has led
some courts to consider the third attack on arbitration: that arbitration
severely impinges on the democratic character of local representative gov-
ernment. 37 The thrust of this charge is that legislative decisions 38 must be
made by individuals or bodies that are politically accountable 39 to the
citizenry represented. When the arbitrator is a private citizen, he or she is
immune from the essential political sensitivity that is at the heart of our
notion of representative government.40
This comment will not consider whether arbitration chills the bargaining
process, 41 or whether strikes by public employees should be legalized; 42 it
will be assumed that a workable arbitration scheme is available to California
lawmakers and that they will indeed enact such a plan. This comment,
instead, will focus on the extent to which California courts will permit a
36. The Michigan Supreme Court, in Dearborn stated:
Under the act, the arbitrator/chairman exercises delegated legislative power, polit-
ical power, the kind of power the Legislature and the Governor possess. But, in
contrast with the Legislature, the Governor, established agencies of government and
other appointees who exercise a continuing responsibility for the administration of
delegated legislative power, the arbitrator/chairman is not accountable through nor-
mal political processes for the critical decisions affecting the distribution and level of
public services and the allocation of public revenues which he independently makes.
394 Mich. at 256, 231 N.W.2d at 235.
37. See, e.g., Greeley Police Union v. City Council, - Colo. -, -, 553 P.2d 790, 792
(1976); Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 256-57, 231
N.W.2d 226, 235 (1975). But see Town of Arlington v. Board of Concil. and Arb., -Mass.-,
-, 352 N.E.2d 914, 922 (1976).
38. Decisions that are "legislative" in character generally produce the declaration of
general principles to be applied prospectively to all those within the jurisdiction of the legisla-
ture. The decision is
usually accompanied by and supplemented with specific regulations designed to
transpose the principle into action . . . . The legislative function, accordingly,
consists of the formulation and validation by government of general rules, principles,
and standards for the regulation of human conduct.
I C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 3 (4th ed. 1972).
39. The Colorado Supreme Court recently stated that fundamental among the basic tenets
of representative government "is the precept that officials engaged in governmental.decision-
making. .. must be accountable to the citizens they represent." Greeley Police Union v. City
Council, - Colo. -, -, 553 P.2d 790, 792 (1976). Accord, Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v.
City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 256, 231 N.W.2d 226, 235 (1975). The phrase "political
accountability," as used throughout this comment, is intended to represent political sensitivity
on the part of decisionmakers to a community as well as the ability of that community to
achieve the removal of the decisionmaker. The source of all political power is the people and
when they delegate this power, the persons who exercise it must remain sensitive to their
constituents. See Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976); Brikenfeld v.
City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 146, 550 P.2d 1001, 1014, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 478 (1976);
Spencer v. City of Alhambra, 44 Cal. App. 2d 75, 77, 111 P.2d 910, 912 (1941).
40. The principle of representation is fundamental to our republican form of government.
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §4; THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
41. Numerous commentators claim that compulsory arbitration inhibits the normal bar-
gaining process. See, e.g., Sullivan, Binding Arbitration in Public Employment Labor Disputes,
36 U. CIN. L. REV. 666, 676 (1967); Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and
the Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. REV. 260, 287 (1969). But see, e.g.,
Davis & Reno, supra note 23, at 24-25; Rehmus, supra note 3, at 311.
42. There has been considerable debate about the desirability of prohibiting public em-
ployee strikes. See, e.g., Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67
MICH. L. REv. 943 (1969); Burton. & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public
Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Burton & Krider]. The debate is
presently academic. Strikes by public employees are occuring at an increasing rate, see note 11
supra, despite their prohibition, see note 10 supra.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 9
legislative mandate for arbitration to intrude on the representative character
of local government, and the methods by which the legislature can build
political accountability into its arbitration scheme.
This comment will examine whether a legislative mandate for interest
arbitration should be binding on California's cities, counties and districts.
To facilitate discussion, all future references to charter cities are intended
also to apply to charter counties, 43 and references to general law cities are
intended also to apply to general law counties and districts." First, three
aspects of the arbitration process will be discussed generally. 45 These
aspects are: (1) the state policy decision to mandate arbitration of local
public employee interest disputes in order to avert strikes; (2) the scope of
arbitrable subjects over which the arbitrator has jurisdiction; and (3) the
procedure for selecting the arbitrator. Second, this comment will consider
whether California's charter cities will be subject to a legislative mandate
for binding interest arbitration. In order to determine whether arbitration
constitutes a "municipal affair" thereby holding charter cities autonomous
from a statewide legislative mandate, the three aspects of the arbitration
process will be examined. Third, the doctrine prohibiting the delegation of
legislative power will be considered as a basis for preventing the legislature
from vesting the local decisionmaking power of both general law and charter
cities in arbitrators who are not politically accountable. Last, methods for
selecting the arbitrator will be inspected to gauge the extent to which the
arbitration process may be made consonant with our representative form of
local government.
ASPECTS OF PUBLIC SECTOR INTEREST ARBITRATION
Three aspects of the interest arbitration process are important to an
analysis of whether a legislative mandate for arbitration will be binding on
California's charter and general law cities. First is the state policy decision
43. Although there is no constitutional doctrine comparable to the "municipal affairs"
doctrine which applies to charter counties, when a charter county has provided for a matter in
its charter, which matter was authorized or required by the constitution, such provision
supersedes general law. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, §4(g). Thus, as to personnel matters general-
ly, charter provisions of charter counties, as with charter cities, will supersede general laws on
the subject, except as to matters of statewide concern. See Pearson v. County of Los Angeles,
49 Cal. 523, 535, 319 P.2d 624, 631 (1957). But see Los Angeles County Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1977) (hearing granted by supreme court, L.A. 30878).
44. As with general law cities, general law counties and districts are political subdivisions
of the state and derive their power solely from the state legislature. Thus, the issues presented
herein with respect to general law cities should apply to general law counties and districts.
Districts are organized and operated under the provisions of CAL. GOV'T CODE §§58001-58243.
General law counties are governed by CAL. GOV'T CODE §§23000-33017.
45. No attempt is made by this comment to examine the entire process of arbitration. Only
three aspects of the process will be considered. For a general discussion of how arbitration
works, see F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (3d ed. 1973); Morris, supra
note 2. Arbitration should be distinguished from other impasse resolution procedures, such as
mediation and fact finding. For a definition and discussion of mediation, see INSTITUTE OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, UCLA, IMPASSE RESOLUTION IN PUBLIC SECTOR INTEREST DISPUTES tab
B (1976), and of factfinding see id. at tab C. A hybrid form of interest arbitration that has been
drawing increased attention is mediation-arbitration or "med-arb." See Morris, supra note 2,
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to employ a neutral46 third party to resolve interest disputes in order to avoid
the interruption of essential local governmental services.47 The second
aspect concerns the scope of arbitration. The scope includes those issues
that the arbitrator should properly be allowed to decide. This is the most
critical element of the arbitration process because by prescribing the range
of arbitrable issues, the arbitrator's impact on the community may be
controlled. Related to the scope of arbitration is the standard imposed by the
state legislature to guide the arbitrator's discretion in resolving the dispute.
The last aspect of the arbitration process concerns the method for selection
of arbitrators. The design of the selection procedure offers an opportunity to
the legislature to build political accountability in an otherwise closed arbitra-
tion process. 48 To facilitate analysis of the problems presented by a- state
mandate for interest arbitration, each aspect will be discussed.
A. Basis for a State Policy to Mandate Arbitration
State legislation that mandates arbitration of local employee disputes is
premised on a need to protect all citizens from the effects of essential service
interruptions. 49 The argument is that cities are interdependent for essential
services, and that a strike in one city will have a direct impact on neighboring
communities. 50 Although the immediate effect of a work stoppage or slow-
down by public employees is typically regional51 in character, it may have
at 461. The procedure permits the neutral third party to interact with the parties and thus assist
them in reaching their own agreement. See Kagel & Kagel, Using Two New Arbitration
Techniques, 95 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 11 (1972).
46. The neutrality of the arbitrator is assured in the private sector by both parties joining
in the selection of the arbitrator. See M. TROTrA, ARBITRATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
DisPuTES 36 (1974). This is the prevailing practice in the public sector as well. See Grodin,
supra note 25, at 17. A politically accountable person is necessarily responsive to the pressures
of the community to which he or she is politically sensitivb. If solely accountable to the
municipality whose dispute is to be settled, his or her neutrality will be questioned by the
employee group. See Grodin, supra note 25, at 16. The qualification of the arbitrator to resolve
the important questions of public finance and social policy which will face him or her is another
important consideration. One way to address this consideration is to require certification of
public sector arbitrators, after they have undergone certain prescribed training. Cf. SB 164,
1977-78 Regular Session (requiring registration with the State Mediation and Conciliation
Service).
47. Reference to essential employees in this comment generally applies to firefighters and
police officers. Arbitration statutes are typically limited to these employee groups. E.g., MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. §423.233 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. §111.77(3) (West Supp. 1975). For a
discussion of the distinction between essential and nonessential employees, see Burton &
Krider, supra note 42, at 427. Another important purpose of interest arbitration is the protec-
tion of the employees' basic bargaining rights. See Sato, supra note 30, at 1060.
48. Under most public sector arbitrator selection procedures, the arbitrators are selected
by the parties to the dispute. Morris, supra note 2, at 464. This selection procedure focuses the
arbitrator's attention on the needs of the disputing parties, and in his or her effort to present at
least an appearance of nonpartisanship (arguably to encourage his or her selection by future
disputants), a "closed" process is created, which reduces the arbitrator's political sensitivity. A
related criticism of this selection procedure is that the parties will be discouraged from engaging
in "hard bargaining" if they anticipate that the arbitrator will "split the difference." See
Morris, supra note 2, at 464. This criticism has given impetus to the increasing use of "final-
offer" arbitration, wherein the arbitrator is limited to selecting the final proposal of either
party. See J. STERN, supra note 19, at 79.
49. Grodin, supra note 25, at 2.
50. See notes 186-197 and accompanying text infra.
51. An example may illustrate the regional impact of essential employee work stoppages.
Suppose City A reaches impasse over a 13% pay raise demand by Union representing police
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statewide repercussions. 2 The contemplated statewide impact of strikes,
which compulsory arbitration is intended to avoid, is thus advanced as the
basis for state legislation. 53 If, however, it is not established that public
employee strikes cause an impact that transcends the geographical bound-
aries of the affected city, the state will lack the constitutional power to
mandate a procedure for establishing the terms of employment for charter
city employees. This is because a charter city, unlike a general law city, is
constitutionally protected from state interference in matters that are exclu-
sively of municipal concern, 54 such as the setting of its employee wage
rates.
55
The statewide impact, if any, of a strike by municipal employees will
depend on the nature of the services withheld. For example, a strike by
firefighters in City X has a higher probability of affecting adjoining City Y
than a strike by X's city painters. Thus, state legislation that mandates
arbitration of municipal employee interest disputes will be binding on
general law cities since they are subject to all state general laws, and will be
binding on charter cities depending on the services rendered by the employ-
ee groups affected.
Another problem presented by state legislation that mandates the resolu-
tion of municipal employee interest disputes by arbitration is whether the
officers. Union calls a work stoppage that is joined by the city's firefighters. The strike ends
four days later when City A's mayor, exercising his emergency powers, succumbs to Union's
demands to end the strike. While no empirical evidence is collected, it appears that the strike
produced an increase in burglaries, vandalism and robberies; as well as severe losses for the
downtown retail business district. The impact from the strike extended beyond the city limits
and had a direct effect on neighboring communities. While the regional effect of the strike is
clear, the impact on the state generally, although present, is definitely not as great. This
example is not entirely imaginary; a similar strike occurred in August 1975 in San Francisco.
See Bowen, Two Case Studies-Facts and Issues, 27 CAL. PUB. EMP. REL. 19 (1975). See
generally Verreos v. City & County of San Francisco, 63 Cal. App. 3d 86, 133 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1976).
52. One important concern for the state during a strike by the essential employees of a
municipality, is the protection of state property located in the municipality. For example,
during the 25-day firefighter strike in Berkeley, the Governor sent 47 State Division of Forestry
firefighters and seven firefighting rigs to protect University property in Berkeley. See Berkeley
Firefighter's 25-Day Strike, 27 CAL. PUB. EMP. REL. 43 (1975). A related reason for requiring
arbitration is the state's concern for the protection of citizens residing in a community that
chooses to endure the essential employee strike, rather than capitulate to employee demands.
This was the position of the city during the Berkeley firefighter strike. Id. This is also
apparently the position of the California League of Cities. See Hearings before the California
Senate Subcommittee on Local Public Employment Practices, Sept. 30, 1976, at 168 (statement
of Don Fausset, Employee Relations, City of Sacramento (representing the California League
of Cities)). But see Horton, Arbitration, Arbitrators, and the Public Interest, 28 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 497, 506 (1975). See also CAL. GOV'T CODE §§8550-8668, 50926.
53. For example, section 1 of SB 164, 1977-78 Regular Session, which was defeated on the
Senate floor on June 23, 1977, provided in part:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that strikes by firefighters and peace
officers are a matter of statewide concern and are not in the public interest and are
illegal. The Legislature further finds and declares that compulsory and binding
arbitration is the appropriate method for resolving disputes that lead to such strikes.
It is the intent of this act to prohibit strikes by peace officers and firefighters. . . and
to establish impasse remedies, including mandatory binding arbitration. . . in lieu of
strikes by such peace officers and firefighters.
54. Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 291, 384 P.2d
158, 167, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 839 (1963).
55. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5(b)(4).
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state may delegate the power of the cities to determine the terms and
conditions of employment for their personnel to a nonpolitically accountable
arbitrator. Interest arbitration is in effect a synonym for delegation. When
two parties voluntarily agree 56 to submit their dispute to arbitration, they
decide to substitute their joint judgment with that of an arbitrator. Further,
these parties may precisely define the arbitrable issues. 57 When, however,
the decision to submit interest disputes to arbitration, and the scope of the
arbitrator's authority is not determined by the affected parties, but is im-
posed by the state, the question arises whether the state possesses the
constitutional authority so to delegate the authority of a city to a nonlocally
accountable arbitrator. The resolution of this question will depend on the
relationship of the nondelegation doctrine to the concern for preserving local
representative government58 and whether the doctrine that prohibits the
delegation of legislative power is violated by the state decision to mandate
arbitration, or by the types of the issues left to arbitration. 59 To explore these
problems fully, the scope of arbitration must first be- discussed.
B. The Scope of Arbitration
Under a compulsory arbitration system, once the parties reach a bargain-
ing deadlock, the dispute is submitted to arbitration. Initially, the arbitrator
must determine whether he or she will have the authority to decide each
disputed issue. 60 Therefore, the arbitrator decides whether each issue falls
within the scope of arbitration. Most state laws do not prescribe the scope of
56. The California Arbitration Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§1280-1288.8, provides for the
enforcement of voluntary agreements to submit existing or future controversies to arbitration.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1281. There is a substantial difference between the state permitting
arbitration of interest disputes by local governments and mandating it. When the local govern-
ing body chooses to agree to arbitration, the community may more directly hold these officials
politically accountable for their decision than if they are required to submit to arbitration by the
state. Compelling local governments to submit to arbitration not only reduces local political
accountability, but permits local officials who are faced with difficult issues to leave the
decision to the arbitrator. Cf. Howlett, Contract Negotiation Arbitration in the Public Sector,
42 CIN. L. REV. 47, 53 (1973) (compulsory arbitration reduces the reasoning process of the
public employer and union representatives).
57. See Townsend v. Pacific Inv. Co., 58 Cal. App.3d 1, 10, 129 Cal. Rptr. 489,493 (1976).
58. See S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
11-12 (1975).
59. See text accompanying notes 260-261 infra.
60. The California Supreme Court in Fire Fighters Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d
608, 611, 526 P.2d 971, 973, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 509 (1974), declared that whether a matter is
arbitrable depends on the facts of each case. The arbitrator should decide whether a matter is
within the scope of arbitration in the first instance, with the understanding that "neither party
may be bound by a decision in excess of the arbitrator's jurisdiction." Quoting Professor
Grodin approvingly, the court noted the dynamic nature of arbitration:
Proposals get modified and non-negotiable positions become negotiable as the parties
sort out their priorities, develop understanding of the implications of their positions,
and perceive alternative solutions which they may not previously have considered.
To determine what is arbitrable and what is not against this changing context is a bit
like trying a balancing act in the middle of a rushing torrent.
Id at 614-15, 526 P.2d at 975, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
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arbitration, 61 and the arbitrator typically applies the guidelines established
for the scope of negotiation.
62
The scope of negotiation 63 encompasses the range of issues64 that the
parties are required, by statute, to discuss in an attempt to reach agree-
ment. 65 Local government employee relations in California are governed by
the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act 66 [hereinafter referred to as the MMB Act].
The MMB Act establishes the scope for negotiation by directing the parties
to meet and confer in good faith, 67 and to endeavor to reach agreement 68 on
"all matters relating to employment conditions and employer-employee
relations, including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment .... ,69
61. Most statutes do not describe the scope of arbitration, but assume that the scope of
arbitration includes all disputed issues within the scope of negotiation. Hence, the statutes
employ language such as "unresolved issues" or "matters in dispute" to define the scope of
arbitration. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, §9 (West Supp. 1975); N. Y. CIV. SERV.
LAW §209(4)(c)(v) (McKinney Supp. 1971-72); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. I1, §548.7 (West Supp.
1974). Some states exclude wages from the scope of arbitration. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26,
§979-D (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS §36-11-9 (Supp. 1974). See also Grodin, supra note 25, at 18-20.
62. See Grodin, supra note 25, at 18-19.
63. The MMB Act refers to the scope of negotiation as the "scope of representation." See
CAL. GOV'T CODE §3504.
64. In Fire Fighters Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 507 (1974), the California Supreme Court relied on private sector cases under the National
Labor Relations Act in interpreting the scope of negotiations. See id. at 617, 526 P.2d at 977, 116
Cal. Rptr. at 513. For a comprehensive analysis of the issues held by California courts to be
within and without the scope of negotiations under the MMB Act, see INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, UCLA, THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING IN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELA-
TIONS, tab B (1977).
65. The MMB Act does not require the parties to reach an agreement; they must only
"meet and confer in good faith" in an effort to reach an agreement. CAL. GOV'T CODE §3505.
The definition of "good faith" requires consultation on all issues that fall within the scope of
negotiation and prohibits unilateral action without negotiation. See International Ass'n of Fire
Fighters v. City of Pleasanton, 56 Cal. App. 3d 959, 966-67, 129 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73-74 (1976).
66. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§3500-3590, enacted by CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 254, at 401. For an
analysis of the MMB Act, see Grodin, California Public Employee Bargaining Revisited: The
MMB Act in the Appellate Courts, 21 CAL. PUB. EMp. REL. 2 (1974); Grodin, Public Employee
Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 719
(1972). California's state employee relations are governed by the Dills Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§3512-3526, (effective July 1, 1978), enacted by CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 1159, at -. For an
analysis of the Dills Act, see REVIEW OF SELECTED 1977 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION, 9 PAC. L.J.
644 (1978). Educational employee relations are governed by the Rodda Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§3540-3549, enacted by CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 961, at 2247. For an analysis of the provisions of
the Rodda Act, see REVIEW OF SELECTED 1975 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION, 7 PAC. L.J. 451 (1976).
Since this comment addresses only local employee relations, references to California public
employee relations are directed to the provisions of the MMB Act.
67. CAL. GOV'T CODE §3505 provides, in part:
Meet and confer in good faith means that a public agency, or such representatives as
it may designate, and representatives of recognized employee organizations, shall
have the mutual obligation personally to meet and confer promptly upon request by
either party and continue for a reasonable period of time in order to exchange freely
information, opinions, and proposals, and to endeavor to reach agreement on matters
within the scope of representation prior to the adoption by the public agency of its
final budget for the ensuing year. The process should include adequate time for the
resolution of impasses where specific procedures for such resolution are contained in
local rule, regulation or ordinance, or when such procedures are utilized by mutual
consent.
68. See Placentia Fire Fighters Local 2147 v. City of Placentia, 57 Cal. App. 3d 9,21, 129
Cal. Rptr. 126, 135 (1976). See note 65 supra.
69. CAL. GOV'T CODE §3504. The right to representation under the MMB Act reaches all
matters of employer-employee relations. CAL. GOV'T CODE §3502. See Social Workers' Local
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Some issues that fall within the scope of negotiation under the MMB Act
involve matters of social planning. 70 These matters are such that political
accountability of the decisionmaker to the community is very important.
Since the MMB Act only requires that the parties meet in good faith and
endeavor to reach agreement, 7 ' the only compulsion to reach agreement is
the result of political pressure on the representatives of the city's governing
body exerted by the community and the employee group.
72
Arbitration is, however, a totally different matter. To be effective, the
resolution of the dispute is no longer voluntary, but is imposed on both
parties to the dispute by the arbitrator. Further, if the scope of the arbit-
rator's authority is congruent with the scope of the parties' negotiations, the
nonpolitically accountable arbitrator may be called upon to decide issues of
social policy that should be left to the political process. Arbitration is
generally regarded as the quid pro quo for the prohibition of local employee
strikes. 73 Thus, it is generally suggested that for arbitration to be effective,
the arbitrator must have the authority to decide all issues upon which the
535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dept., II Cal. 3d 382, 387, 521 P.2d 453, 456, 113 Cal. Rptr.
461, 464 (1974).
70. See generally Grodin, supra note 25; see also Summers, Public Employee Bargaining:
A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974). There are generally three types of issues,
which may be within the scope of negotiation and thus arbitration, that an arbitrator may decide
or influence. The firstcategory consists of decisions having direct and precise economic impact
upon the municipal fisc, such as wages and related matters. The second consists of those
matters that result in costs to the employer, but are not within the generic definition of wages.
For example, the number of police officers assigned per patrol car is a matter directly affecting
the working conditions and workload of the employees that involves important social policy
considerations as well as increased costs. The third type of arbitrable dispute consists of issues
that present no perceptible financial impact upon the community but relate to working condi-
tions. An example of an issue in this category is the procedure to be followed by a citizen's
police review board. Such a board was established by initiative in Berkeley, California (Ber-
keley, Cal., Ordinance 4644-NS (Apr. 1974)), where a superior court held the review
board was required to "meet and confer" with the local police officers association prior to
adopting its hearing procedures. (Police Ass'n v. Police Review Comm'n, Civil No. 459-645-9
(Alameda County Sup. Ct., Feb. 7, 1975)). See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct.
1782, 1797 (1977). The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the exercise of political influ-
ence on government decisionmaking by public employee unions through the collective bargain-
ing process. 97 S. Ct. at 1796.
71. See notes 67 & 68 supra. Once an agreement is reached, however, it is enforceable
against both parties by writ of mandamus. See notes 7 supra and 257 infra.
72. See 97 S. Ct. at 1796.
Professors Wellington and Winter argue that the process of collective bargaining gives
employees too much power over officials who are responsive to political pressure from the
community. Therefore, public employees should be left, as any other special interest group, to
the normal political process. See Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in
Public Employment, 78 YALE L. J. 1107, 1123 (1969). Professor Summers suggests that as to
some issues, such as wages, public employees are apt to be at a political disadvantage without
collective bargaining. See Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83
YALE L. J. 1156, 1160 (1974).
73. The City of Vallejo court ruled that the no-strike clause in the Vallejo charter was
interdependent with the provision for arbitration. The court relied on a private sector ruling in
Boys Market, Inc. v. Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), to conclude that:
mhe employee's quid pro quo for this no-strike provision consisted of the arbitrabifi-
ty of all disputes. . . .Any interpretation of the Vallejo charter which improperly
failed to require arbitration on the full range of negotiable issues would not only
erroneously curtail arbitration but would invite the very labor strife which the charter
provisions seek to prevent.
12 Cal. 3d at 622-23, 526 P.2d at 981, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 517. (Emphasis in original and added).
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parties have been unable to reach agreement.74 To achieve the legislative
purpose of arbitration, which is to avoid public employee strikes,75 it is thus
asserted that the scope for arbitration should be congruent to the scope for
negotiation. Congruent scopes for negotiation and arbitration remove im-
portant issues of social planning from the hands of politically accountable
officials and impose a binding and final settlement of the dispute upon the
community. If negotiated issues, which reach impasse, are kept outside the
scope of arbitration, however, the quid pro quo is eliminated and the
purpose of the arbitration law is frustrated.
The tension between the desire for an effective strike deterrent and the
concern for keeping policymaking in the hands of accountable officials
presents a dilemma for lawmakers. This dilemma is generally resolved by
prescribing standards to guide the arbitrator's discretion.76 The standards
imposed on the arbitrator are typically oriented to the economic impact of
the award on either the employees or the city; such as the city's ability to
finance the award, 77 the consumer-price index, 78 and the wages paid to
similar private sector employees. 79 This approach is premised on the notion
that by guiding the arbitrator's discretion, fair and uniform decisions will be
rendered and the arbitration process will thus be successful. 80 Besides
ignoring the impact on the representative form of local government, how-
ever, use of this approach tends to increase the magnitude of the dilemma.
For example, a standard that is frequently prescribed is consideration of the
municipality's ability to pay for the award. 81 Implicit in this requirement is
an evaluation of the city's allocation of resources and its setting of priorities
as well as an examination of the community's comparative tax effort. 82
Although the arbitrator does not technically usurp the city's taxing power
since the act of raising taxes is left to the local governing body,83 the
74. See Grodin, supra note 25, at 19. See also Wollett, The Bargaining Process in the
Public Sector: What is Bargainable?, 51 ORE. L. REV. 177 (1971).
75. See notes 47 & 53 and text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
76. See Grodin, supra note 25, at 9.
77. E.g.- MINN. STAT. ANN. §179.72 subdiv. 7 (West Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT.
§288.200(8)(a) (1975); OR. REV. STAT. §243.746 (1974). See Grodin, supra note 25, at 9-10; Zack,
Ability to Pay In Public Sector Bargaining, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 403 (T. Christensen & A. Christensen eds.
1971).
78. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §423.239 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11l.77(6)(e) (West
1974). Some states do not require consideration of any cost of living analyses but require
consideration of such employment related factors as hazards and physical and mental qualifica-
tions and skills. E.g., N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW §209(14)(c)(v)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1975); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-1, §13(a) (Vernon Supp. 1975). In other states, the arbitrator is
also required to consider "the interests and welfare of the public," e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.
§20.22(9)(c) (West Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §548.10(4) (West Supp. 1974). Three
states-Alaska, Pennsylvania and South Dakota-do not prescribe any standards to guide the
arbitrator's discretion.
79. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-1, §§4,13 (Vernon Supp. 1975); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §41.56.460(c) (Supp. 1975).
80. See Davis & Reno, supra note 23, at 25.
81. See note 75 supra.
82. Grodin, supra note 25, at 9-10.
83. California cities are largely subject to fiscal policies established by the state. See CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§53732, 53734. Further, an increase in local government costs that result from
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practical effect of the award is an exercise of the taxing power.84 The courts
that have considered this point have dismissed it by relying on the technical
distinction between how to finance the award and whether to finance it.85
If the arbitrator determines that the city's taxpayers can afford the con-
templated award, strikes will be avoided, but the arbitrator will have
directed either a tax increase or a reallocation of the city's resources.
Alternatively, if the arbitrator finds the citizenry cannot afford to meet the
employees' demand, the risk of a strike is heightened. Thus, in neither case
are both the concerns for strike avoidance and for keeping policymaking in
the hands of the elected official satisfied. Rather, the dilemma created by the
tension between these two competing concerns is increased by requiring the
arbitrator to play the policymaking role of judging the city's ability to pay.
Another approach to resolving the dilemma created by congruent scopes
is to narrow the scope of negotiation. Typically "narrowing" excludes from
the bargaining table matters that extend to the managerial prerogatives of the
city, such as the setting of standards for services or the size of the work
force. This is done in the MMB Act by requiring negotiation over issues that
relate to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment"
86
and by excluding from negotiation matters that relate to "the merits,
necessity, or organization of any service or activity . . ".."87 The motiva-
tion for the latter "management rights proviso" 88 is "the trepidation that the
both the arbitration process, as well as the arbitrator's award, may constitute a "state-
mandated local cost," thereby making the state liable for these costs. CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE §2231 (SB 90). See Op. CAL. LEGIS. COUNSEL No. 1311 (Jan. 23, 1976) State-mandated
Local Costs: Labor Relations (SB 1294).
84. Professor Grodin states that the options facing a community that cannot "afford" the
arbitrator's award are: (1) cut back the labor force; (2) reduce or do away with other municipal
services; (3) increase taxes; or (4) borrow money. Grodin, supra note 25, at 7. When the
arbitrator considers the ability of the city to finance the contemplated award, he or she
explicitly or implicitly examines these options. Not only do these considerations involve issues
of social policy that should be left to the political arena, but an arbitrator's award that
eliminates an option, by, for example, directing an increase in the work force, as well as the
cost of labor, results in effectively directing a tax increase. In the 1975 Oakland arbitration
award, arbitrator Arthur B. Jacobs, directed, inter alia, the total minimum firefighter work
force; the minimum manning level per company, as well as a wage and benefit increase. Local
55, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. City of Oakland, Feb. 15, 1975 (Jacobs, Arb.) (copy on file at
Pacific Law Journal). See also Ross, The Arbitration of Public Employee Wage Disputes, 23
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 3 (1969).
85. See, e.g., City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19,27-28,332 N.E.2d 290,293,371
N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (1975); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, - Wash. 2d -, -, 553
P.2d 1316, 1319 (1976).
86. CAL. GOV'T CODE §3504.
87. CAL. GOV'T CODE §3504.
88. The "management rights proviso" in private sector labor relations has no statutory
origin. The courts, however, have segregated from the scope of mandatory bargaining, those
issues that are solely management functions. See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co.,
380 U.S. 263, 267, n.5 (1965); Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203,213 (1964).
The MMB Act explicitly excludes management functions from the scope of negotiations. See
text accompanying notes 86-90 supra. Nearly all of the California cities and counties that have
enacted local employer-employee relations provisions, provide for management rights provisos
as part of the scope of negotiation language. See P. TAMOUSH, LOCAL OPTION IN THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS: CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS
22 (1977) [hereinafter cited as P. TAMOUSH]. See note 90 and accompanying text infra.
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union would extend its province into matters that should properly remain in
the hands of employers .... "89 This proviso, however, has been narrow-
ly construed by California courts.
9°
In Fire Fighters Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo,91 one of the union
demands was for the addition of one fire engine company and for an increase
in the number of personnel assigned to the present companies, 92 This
demand entailed the possible construction of a new fire station and the
purchase of new equipment. 93 The city contended the demand was outside
the scope of negotiation and thus outside the scope of arbitration since it
related to the city's fire prevention policy. 94 The union countered that it was
not seeking to influence the city's policy, but instead its demand was
directed at the workload and safety of its members. 95 Although the demand
was withdrawn prior to appeal, the California Supreme Court commented
that the determination of this question would depend on the purpose of the
union's demand. If the union proved its demand was primarily related to the
working conditions of its members, then the parties would be required to
discuss it.96 Furthermore, since the Vallejo Charter provided for arbitration
of disputes, the court stated that *the determination of whether this demand
was arbitrable should be made initially by the arbitrator 97 and should be
directed at achieving congruency with the scope of negotiation. 98 Thus,
under an arbitration provision that does not specify the scope of the arbit-
rator's authority, in order to achieve the quidpro quo for the prohibition of
strikes, the arbitrator, upon finding an issue within the scope for negotia-
tion, would be compelled to decide it.
The union demand considered by the City of Vallejo court suggests the
variety of issues that potentially face an arbitrator. Most of these are not
susceptible to the formulation of standards to guide the arbitrator's discre-
tion. 99 Thus, an arbitrator confronted with a union demand that primarily
relates to employee working conditions and yet arguably impinges on the
city's policymaking authority, must either decide the issue, or disregard the
union's evidence and classify it as outside the scope of arbitration. The
89. Fire Fighters Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608,616,526 P.2d 971,976,116
Cal. Rptr. 507, 512 (1974).
90. See, e.g., id.; Los Angeles County Emps. Ass'n. Local 660 v. County of Los Angeles,
33 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7-8, 108 Cal. Rptr. 625, 629-30 (1973). Cf. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters
v. City of Pleasanton, 56 Cal. App. 3d 959, 968, 129 Cal. Rptr. 68, 74 (1976) (scope of
negotiation to be liberally construed). But see San Francisco Fire Fighters, Local 798 v. Board
of Supervisors, 1 Civ. No. 38823 (filed and certified for publication Dec. 14, 1977) at 15.
91. 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1974).
92. Id. at 618, 526 P.2d at 978, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
93. Id. at 619, 526 P.2d at 978, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 620-21, 526 P.2d at 979, 116 Cal. Rptr.at 515.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 621, 526 P.2d at 980-81, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17.
99. See text accompanying notes 257-258 infra.
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implications of either decision should be considered. If the City of Vallejo
arbitrator decides the issue in favor of the union, although the focus is on
'working conditions, he or she will inevitably modify the fire prevention
policy for the city. If the Vallejo community is dissatisfied with this result it
has no recourse since the arbitrator's 1" award will be enforceable against
it. 10 Alternatively, the arbitrator may decide that this issue should be left
to the political process." Such a refusal to decide the issue may undermine
the credibility of the arbitrator, thereby reducing his or her effectiveness,
and may ultimately frustrate the legislative purpose for arbitration.1
03
This comment suggests that the most promising approach for resolving
the dilemma created by congruent scopes is to focus on the procedure for
selecting the arbitrator, which will be examined next. This approach appears
most attractive when it is recognized that attempts to guide an arbitrator's
discretion by imposing standards may complicate the problem rather than
resolve it, and that many issues within a congruent scope of arbitration are
not susceptible to prior guidance by the legislature.
C. Selecting the Arbitrator
Most state arbitration laws provide for tripartite arbitration panels.
1°4
Each party to the dispute selects one person to serve on the panel. The two
"partisan arbitrators" then choose a third person who acts as a neutral
chairperson. The principal benefit to this approach is mediative. 10 5 The
primary alternative to the tripartite panel is selection of a single arbitrator. 16
Under either procedure, it is generally believed that by participating in the
selection of the arbitrator, the parties' confidence in and thus the effective-
100. References made to arbitration in this comment are intended to include both single ad
hoc arbitrators as well as panels of arbitrators. The City of Vallejo Charter provides for a panel
of three arbitrators. VALLEJO CHARTER §810 (quoted at 12 Cal. 3d at 613 n.3, 526 P.2d at 974 n.3,
116 Cal. Rptr. at 510 n.3). Most states provide for tripartite arbitration panels. See note 104
infra.
101. Most states provide that an arbitrator's award is final and binding on both parties.
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §7-473(c)(3) (West Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§28-9.1-9,
.2-9 (1969). The normal statutory procedure is to permit judicial enforcement of an award.
Morris, supra note 2, at 492. Most of the states with interest arbitration statutes permit an
award to be contested on only narrow grounds. E.g., N.J. REV. STAT. §§2A: 24-8, 24-9 (1952);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1733(c) (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. §298.11 (1958).
The Vallejo City government has twice attempted to repeal the charter arbitration provision.
These attempts failed by increasingly greater margins at each election. Davis & Reno, supra
note 23, at 26.
102. By refusing to decide an issue believed to belong in the political arena, the arbitrator
forces the employees to rely upon political weapons to induce agreement to their desired
position. See Grodin, supra note 25, at 19-20. See note 14 supra.
103. Cf. Grodin, supra note 25, at 13-14 (most arbitrators regard arbitration as an extension
of the collective bargaining process and are likely to seek to resolve disputes by locating areas
of flexibility).
104. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, §965 (1974); MICH. CoMP. LAWS §423.235 (Supp. 1976);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §217.4 (Purdon Supp. 1975).
105. See J. STERN, supra note 19, at 124. But see Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the
Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 3, 36 (criticizing the use of tripartite panels).
106. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §20.22 (West Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. §179.72 (Supp. 1976);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §111.77(3) (West Supp. 1974). Nebraska provides a Court of Industrial
Relations. NEB. REV. STAT. §48-810 (1974).
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ness of the arbitration process is increased. 0 7 Either selection procedure
provides an alternative method for choosing the neutral arbitrator-chairper-
son when the parties are unable to agree. Typically this is done by each party
alternatively striking names from a list of names maintained by a state
agency. 08 When a party refuses to select a partisan arbitrator or strike a
name from the list, the agency that administers the state's arbitration law
may make the appointment.t19
The Michigan Supreme Court recently decided that the appointment of
the neutral chairperson of an arbitration panel by a politically accountable
government official was necessary to satisfy a constitutional requirement of
continuing political accountability for local policymaking."10 Requiring ar-
bitrators to be politically accountable appears as an appealing middle ground
between the view that regards arbitration as an extension of the negotiation
process I 'I and the view that expresses concern for the impact of arbitration
on the representative character of local government." 2 If the arbitrator is
answerable to the local governing body his or her effectiveness will suf-
fer. 113 Alternatively, if the arbitrator is answerable to the state legislative
body, sensitivity to local conditions and thus accountability to the communi-
ty may be lost. The middle ground occupied by the politically accountable
arbitrator permits the arbitration process to avoid strikes without sacrificin.g
the essential ingredients of representative government. This comment,
therefore, suggests that arbitrators be appointed by politically accountable
officials on a regional level. 114 Arbitrator selection at this intermediate level
107. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 25, at 17; McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract
Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
1192, 1197 (1972).
108. E.g., IowA CODE ANN §20.22(5) (West Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, §965(4)
(1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §34-20a-8 (Supp. 1975).
109. In Michigan, the neutral chairman must be selected from a list of names compiled by
the Michigan Employee Relations Commission. The names are taken from a panel of arbitrators
appointed indefinitely after being administered a constitutional oath. MIcH. COMP. LAWS
§423.235 (Supp. 1976). California has recently created a public employee relations board. CAL.
GOV'T CODE §3541, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 1159, at -.
110. Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226
(1975). Justice Williams noted that:
Collective bargaining in the public sector is part of the public process, and thus
persons bearing the ultimate political responsibility must not isolate themselves from
the process. While it is not necessary that elected officials themselves do the arbitrat-
ing, citizens should be able to identify every elected official responsible for the result
of the arbitration--either because he was an arbitrator or appointed the arbitrator.
Id. at 315-16, 231 N.W.2d at 264.
111. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
112. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
113. See Grodin, supra note 25, at 16.
114. An important consideration in defining the boundaries of each region is the population
density. For example, the San Francisco bay area may warrant several regions, e.g., Peninsula,
East Bay, and North Bay regions. Less densely populated areas, such as some Northern
California areas, may warrant larger geographical boundaries. A prerequisite to being selected
to serve on a regional board of arbitrators should be either residence in the region or intimate
knowledge of the needs and concerns of the area. These boards could serve the additional
valuable function of monitoring employer-employee relations in the area. A system of "mini-
perbs" serves this function in New York. See P. TAMOUSH, supra note 88, at 2-3. This
suggestion may be regarded as a step toward "metropolitan governments," an idea which has
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should produce individuals attuned to the unique local condition; yet not
directly answerable to the local governments.
The foregoing has examined three aspects of the interest arbitration
process in the public sector. A state policy that mandates arbitration of
interest disputes is premised on a desire to avoid strikes by essential public
employees. While there appears a need to build political accountability in an
otherwise politically insulated arbitration process, caution should be exer-
cised so that the process remains effective in avoiding strikes. Therefore, it
was suggested that the scope of negotiation and the scope of arbitration
should be congruent and that preservation of the representative character of
local government may best be achieved by focusing on building political
accountability in the arbitrator selection procedure. Thus, it was recom-
mended that arbitrators be appointed by politically accountable officials and
should serve on regional panels.
This comment next examines the aspects of the arbitration process to
determine whether a legislative mandate for interest arbitration will be
binding on charter cities. Following this examination, the comment will
consider whether the mandate will constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power. Finally, the comment will return for a closer examination
of the recommendation for a regional panel of politically appointed arbit-
rators.
INTEREST ARBITRATION-BINDING ON CHARTER CITIES?
Concern for representative local government was first manifested by the
California courts in the late 1800's.115 The courts relied on the "right to
local self-government" to insulate cities from state interference in matters of
purely local concern." 6 In 1896,117 and again in 1914,118 constitutional
amendments were enacted granting chartered cities immunity from state
interference in matters concerning municipal affairs. 
119
When the state legislature enacts a law intended to deal with a matter that
concerns the state generally, such as a statewide compulsory arbitration law,
a statewide concern is expressed. When, however, the substance of the state
law directly interferes with matters of exclusively municipal concern, the
previously been prioposed. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SUB-
COMM., HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T OPNS., 89TH CONG. 2D SESS., METROPOLITAN AMERICA:
CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 1-9 (Comm. Print 1966).
115. People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15 (1875).
116. Id.; see Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California 1, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6-22
(1941). In Hoagland v. City of Sacramento, 52 Cal. 142 (1877), the California Supreme Court
also relied on the concept of "no taxation without representation" to preserve local autonomy
from state interference. The "inherent right" doctrine has been vigorously attacked as incon-
sistent with the premises of the American constitutional system. McBain, The Doctrine of an
Inherent Right to Local Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 190, 299 (1916).
117. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §6 (1896).
118. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §6 (1914). A corresponding amendment was made to Section 8.
119. See Sato, supra note 30, at 1056.
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law will not be binding on charter cities. 120 In the case of a statewide
compulsory arbitration law, the interest of the state is uniformily to avoid
local labor strife by the arbitration of disputes and thereby to avert public
employee strikes that detrimentally affect the state's citizenry. 121 The inter-
est of the municipality is to retain control over decisionmaking on the issues
that cause the disputes, and thereby maintain local accountability for
policies that directly affect the community. The determination of whether a
law is to be binding on a charter city depends on whether the law primarily
deals with a matter of statewide rather than municipal concern. 122 If the law
only incidentally affects a municipal affair in the accomplishment of the
matter of statewide concern, then it may be applied to the charter city.
123
Thus, a law that deals with a matter of exclusively municipal concern will
not be binding on a charter city.1
24
Interpreting the concept of "municipal affairs" has been a difficult duty
for California courts." Recognizing that it must remain sensitive to the
changing demands of society, the supreme court has cautioned that "[w]hat
may at one time have been a matter of local concern may at a later time
become a matter of state concern controlled by the general laws of the
state. ' 126 Thus, rather than announcing guidelines for determining the
nature of municipal affairs, the court has stated that it would define
"municipal affairs" on a case-by-case basis.127 Furthermore, the supreme
court has declared itself as the final arbiter of whether a matter is of'
statewide concern. 28 While the purpose of the legislature in enacting a
general law is important, this fact alone is not determinative. 1
29
In order to predict whether a legislative mandate for arbitration will be
binding on California's seventy-seven chartered cities,130 it is necessary to
120. See Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 291, 384
P.2d 158, 167, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 839 (1963).
121. See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
122. See Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 62, 460 P.2d 137, 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465,
469 (1969); CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5.
123. Wilson v. Walters, 19 Cal. 2d 111, 119, 119 P.2d 340, 344 (1941).
124. Personnel matters have long been held to be an area in which charter provisions
prevail over state law. See Pearson v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. 2d 523,536, 319 P.2d 624,
632 (1957). Certain other matters have been classified as municipal affairs. For example: public
employee salaries, Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456, 56 P. 53 (1899); the discipline of public
employees, Shewbridge v. Police Comm'n, 64 Cal. App. 2d 787, 149 P.2d 429 (1944); and the
imposition of residency requirements for public employees, Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.
3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973) (overruled by constitutional amendment, Nov. 5,
1974, see CAL. CONsT: art. XI, §10(b)).
125. Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 214, 74 P. 780, 784 (1903), in which concurring Justice
McFarland lamented, "The section of the constitution in question uses the loose, indefinable,
wild words 'municipal affairs,' and imposes upon the courts the almost impossible duty of
saying what they mean." Id.
126. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766, 771, 336
P.2d 514, 517 (1959).
127. Butterworth v. Boyd, 12 Cal. 2d 140, 147, 82 P.2d 434, 438 (1938).
.128. 1 Cal. 3d at 63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
129. Id. The court emphasized that "the Legislature is empowered neither to determine
what constitutes a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into a matter of statewide
concern." Id.
130. See LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, supra note 30, at v.
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determine whether arbitration constitutes a matter of municipal or statewide
concern. Therefore, the aspects of the arbitration process will be examined
in light of the judicial opinions interpreting the constitutional provision
131
granting chartered cities autonomy from state interference in municipal
affairs. At the outset, it is important to emphasize the distinction between
the interest of the state in averting public employee strikes by mandating
arbitration of disputes and the interest of the municipalities in retaining
control over the substance of the disputes. Therefore, the following analysis
will attempt to ascertain whether, in light of these competing interests, a
statewide compulsory arbitration law will constitute a statewide concern and
therefore be binding on charter cities in California.
A. Public Sector Labor Relations
The present status of municipal employee labor relations laws in Califor-
nia and their application to charter cities provides a useful starting point for
an analysis of whether a legislative mandate for interest arbitration will be
binding on charter cities. Labor relations for all municipal employees,
except for educational employees, 132 are governed by the MMB Act. Prior
to the enactment of the MMB Act133 special sections of the Labor Code,
relating to firefighters, were adopted. 134 These sections gave firefighters
certain basic rights to join a labor organization 135 and to present grievances
and recommendations regarding wages, salaries, hours and working condi-
tions. 136 This law, which also expressly prohibits strikes by firefighters,'
37
supplements the provisions of the MMB Act that ore currently applied to
labor relations with firefighters.138 Neither the provisions of the Labor Code
nor the MMB Act provide for any impasse resolution procedure. 139 Thus,
the selection of an impasse resolution procedure has been a matter left to
each community by the state legislature.140 Both the firefighter provisions of
the Labor Code and certain provisions of the MMB Act have been held by
131. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §6.
132. See note 66 supra.
133. With the enactment of the George Brown Act, CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 1964, at 4141,
which preceded the MMB Act, California became one of'the first states in the nation statutorily
to recognize the concept of public employee bargaining. Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in
California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 719, 719 (1972).
134. CAL. LAB. CODE §§1960-1963, enacted by CAL. STArS. 1959, c, 723, at 2711.
135. CAL. LAB. CODE §1960.
136. CAL. LAB. CODE §1962.
137. CAL. LAB. CODE §1962.
138. See Los Angeles County Firefighters Local 1014 v. City of Monrovia, 24 Cal. App. 3d
289, 101 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1972).
139. The MMB Act provides for mediation, CAL. GOV'T CODE §3505.2, but the parties are
not required to place disputed matters in the hands of a mediator. Placentia Fire Fighters Local
2147 v. City of Placentia, 57 Cal. App. 3d 9, 21, 129 Cal. Rptr. 126, 135 (1976).
140. The use of impasse resolution procedures other than mediation is permitted by charter
cities only. See Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach, 18 Cal. 3d 22, 25, 553 P.2d 1140, 1142, 132
Cal. Rptr. 668, 670 (1976). Cities and counties are allowed to employ factfinding under the
Redda Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§3548.1-.3. For a survey of impasse resolution procedures
employed by selected California cities and counties, see P. TAMOUSH, supra note 88, at 20-21.
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California courts to apply to charter cities. 141
Ruling on the applicability of the firefighter provision of the Labor
Code142 to a charter city, the California Supreme Court in Professional
Firefighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles' 43 stated that since the "Legislature
was attempting to deal with labor relations on a statewide basis" ' 144 with the
intention of providing certain special rights and benefits to firefighters 145 in
order to "create uniform fair labor practices throughout the state," 146 the
law was binding on charter cities, despite some impingement on local
control. 147 The unanimous court reasoned that the law was not depriving
local government of management or control of its fire department, but was
simply imposing standards for uniform statewide fair labor relations. 148 The
court's holding appears to rest on its finding that the legislature was attempt-
ing to deal with a problem in a uniform statewide manner and that the local
effect of the law would only incidentally impact on the municipal affairs of
the chartered city. 1
49
The Professional Firefighters court found support for its contention that
labor relations with firefighters was a matter of statewide concern in the
holdings of twenty-two cases in which matters typically of municipal con-
cern were found to be governed by state law due to the desire of the
legislature to deal with these matters on a statewide basis. 150 This aspect of
the court's rationale is presently of questionable validity due to the rea-
soning in Bishop v. City of San Jose,151 in which the California Supreme
Court stated that while the desire of the legislature to deal with a matter on a
statewide basis will be given great weight, that fact alone will not be
determinative to the court's conclusion that a matter is either a municipal
affair or a matter of statewide concern. 152 The court's departure from its
previous Professional Firefighters rationale prompted Justice Peters, in his
sharp dissent, to argue that Bishop impliedly overruled Professional
Firefighters. 1 53 Nevertheless, Professional Firefighters appears to be viable
141. See Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 294-95,
384 P.2d 158, 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 841 (1963); San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. Board
of Supervisors, I Civ. No. 38823 (filed and certified for publication Dec. 14, 1977) at 6; Los
Angeles County Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 126, 130 (1977)
(hearing granted by supreme court, L.A. 30878); Huntington Beach Police Officers' Ass'n v.
City of Huntington Beach, 58 Cal. App. 3d 492,500, 129 Cal. Rptr. 893,898 (1976); San Leandro
Police Officers Ass'n v. City of San Leandro, 55 Cal. App. 3d 553, 557, 127 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858
(1976).
142. CAL. LAB. CODE §§1960-1963.
143. 60 Cal. 2d 276, 384 P.2d 158, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963).
144. Id. at 294, 384 P.2d at 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
145. Id. at 291, 384 P.2d at 167, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
146. Id. at 295, 384 P.2d at 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 294-95, 384 P.2d at 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 294, 384 P.2d at 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
151. 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969).
152. Id. at 63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
153. Id. at 67, 460 P.2d at 144, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (Peters, J., dissenting). Justice Peters
was joined by two other Justices in his dissent.
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authority for the proposition that "[]abor relations in the public sector are
matters of statewide concern .... " 154 This statement was the basis for the
Fourth District Court of Appeal holding in Huntington Beach Police Offi-
cers'Ass'n v. City of Huntington Beach155 that a charter city is bound by the
definition of scope of negotiation in the MMB Act. 116 Because of the unique
nature of the MMB Act, which permits broad local flexibility in the im-
plementation of the objectives of the Act, 157 the courts seldom have been
faced with cases calling for a distinction between the applicability of the
MMB Act to charter cities versus general law cities.
Two recent cases are, however, worthy of note. First, in Bagley v. City of
Manhattan Beach 158 the supreme court held that a general law city properly
withheld from the ballot a proposed initiative measure providing for binding
arbitration of interest disputes with the firefighting personnel of the city
because the city was not permitted to delegate its Wage-setting authority
without an express authorization from the state legislature. 159 The court
buttressed its ruling, which was based on a general law 160 outside of the
MMB Act, on a construction of the MMB Act in which it determined that
the Act did not permit the use of arbitration to resolve interest disputes.
161
Significantly, the court compared its previous ruling in Fire Fighters Local
1186 v. City of Vallejo,162 in which it had enforced a similar arbitration
provision 63 for a charter city. The difference between the two cases lies in
the nature of the city; Vallejo is a charter city, while Manhattan Beach is a
general law city.164 Although Bagley does indicate that the court is sensitive
to the difference between charter cities and general law cities in the field of
154. Huntington Beach Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of Huntington Beach, 58 Cal. App.
3d 492, 500, 129 Cal. Rptr. 893, 898 (1976).
155. 58 Cal. App. 3d 492, 129 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1976).
156. Id. at 503, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
157. CAL. GOV'T CODE §3507; see P. TAMOUSH, supra note 88, at I; Grodin, Public
Employee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 719, 724-25 (1972).
158. 18 Cal. 3d 22, 553 P.2d 1140, 132 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1976).
159. Id. at 26-27, 553 P.2d at 1143, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
160. CAL. GOV'T CODE §36506.
161. The Bagley court stated that "the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act provides for negotiation
and permits the local agency and the employee organization to agree to mediation but not to...
binding arbitration. 18 Cal. 3d at 25, 553 P.2d at 1142, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 670 (emphasis in
original). This language is susceptible to different interpretations. If the court means that the
MMB Act does not authorize arbitration, then the legislature has not attempted to foreclose its
use by chartered cities. Rather, the legislature has neither encouraged nor discouraged the use
of arbitration by local agencies. If, however, the court reads the MMB Act provision as
pronouncing a legislative intent to prohibit arbitration, then by virtue of the previous unani-
mous endorsement of the Vallejo charter arbitration provision, see Fire Fighters Local 1186 v.
City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 622 n.13, 526 P.2d 971, 981 n.13, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 517 n.13
(1974), the court suggests that impasse resolution under the MMB Act may be a municipal
affair left to charter cities.
162. 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1974).
163. Compare id. at 612-13 nn.2 & 3, 526 P.2d 974-75 nn. 2 & 3, 116 Cal. Rptr. 510-11 nn. 2
& 3 with Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach, 123 Cal. Rptr. 908,909-10 (1975) (court of appeal
decision).
164. The Bagley court noted, "Although Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo . . .
approved arbitration provisions adopted by initiative, Vallejo is a chartered city-not a general
law city subject to Government Code section 36506." 18 Cal. 3d at 27 n.1, 553 P.2d at 1143 n. 1,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 671 n.l.
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labor relations, it is of limited value to this analysis since the primary basis
for the court's holding was the general wage-setting law, 165 and not the
MMB Act.
Second, in San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. Board of Super-
visors166 the First District Court of Appeal ruled that the charter city board
of supervisors was not required by the MMB Act to meet and confer in good
faith with the employee representatives prior to placing a measure that
affected the employment conditions on the ballot. 167 The court founded its
ruling on the different concept of goverment employed by charter cities,
whose citizens, unlike those of general law cities, have "elected to be
governed by a charter which they themselves legislated into existence by
majority vote." 168 Thus, since the power to place proposed charter amend-
ments on the ballot was constitutionally granted to the board of super-
visors, 169 the court ruled that the MMB Act had no application. This ruling
suggests that a charter city could circumvent the provisions of the MMB Act
by enacting conflicting charter provisions. This holding is not reconcilable
with the Huntington Beach case, in which the court noted that
[a]lthough the Legislature did not intend to preempt all aspects of
labor relations in the public sector, we cannot attribute to it an
intention to permit local entities to adopt regulations which would
frustrate the declared policies and purposes of the MMB Act.
Were we to uphold the city's regulation in question, local entities
would. .. "undercut the very purpose which the act purports to
serve. "170
The court went on, quoting Professor Grodin approvingly, "ITihe power
reserved to local agencies to adopt rules and regulations was intended to
permit supplementary local regulations which are 'consistent with, and
effectuate the declared purposes of, the statute as a whole.' "171
Arguably, since the Huntington Beach provision was not part of the city
charter, but was a city council resolution, 172 it is distinguishable from San
Francisco Fire Fighters which involved proposed charter provisions. 17 3
Such a distinction appears, however, to be illusory. The question facing
both courts was the extent to which a charter city should be permitted to
circumvent the requirements imposed by the MMB Act. The method em-
ployed by either city to achieve the circumvention should not be relevant.
Central to the ruling of the San Francisco Fire Fighters court was concern
165. CAL. GOV'T CODE §36506.
166. 1 Civ. No. 38823 (filed and certified for publication Dec. 14, 1977).
167. Id. at 15-16.
168. Id. at 16.
169. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §3. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §34459.
170. 58 Cal. App. 3d at 501-02, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
171. Id. at 502, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
172. Id. at 495, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
173. 1 Civ. No. 38823 (filed and certified for publication Dec. 14, 1977) at 4-5.
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for preserving the power of the electorate to affect local decisionmaking. 174
The Bagley court did not share this concern, however, when it was faced
with a similar claim in a case involving a general law city.175 The manner in
which the supreme court resolves the conflict between Huntington Beach
and San Francisco Fire Fighters will be indicative of its posture vis-ti-vis
arbitration. An endorsement of the Huntington Beach analysis would sug-
gest support for a statewide arbitration law to which charter cities would be
subject. Alternatively, endorsement of the San Francisco Fire Fighters
analysis would suggest an expression of support for both local autonomy
from a statewide arbitration law, as well as concern for preserving local
decisionmaking in the hands of the local electorate.
The courts have not yet been faced with the question whether a statewide
arbitration law should be binding on charter cities. When faced with such a
question, their conclusion should depend on whether the legislative mandate
for interest arbitration presents a sufficient statewide concern to warrant the
intrusion into the municipal affairs of charter cities. In order to reach a
conclusion, the courts should examine the three aspects of the arbitration
process, to which this comment next turns.
B. The Decision to Arbitrate
The impact caused by public employee strikes varies depending upon the
nature of the services withheld. Burton and Krider suggest that public
services can be divided into three categories:
176
(1) essential services-police and fire-where strikes immediately
endanger public health and safety; (2) intermediate services-
sanitation, hospitals, transit, water, and sewage-where strikes of
a few days might be tolerated; (3) nonessential services-streets,
parks, education, housing, welfare and general administration-
where strikes of indefinite duration could be tolerated. 
lr
Noting that essentiality of the service depends on the size of the community
affected, 178 they argue that strike prohibitions should not be extended
beyond the first category. 179 Other scholars, notably Professors Wellington
and Winter, favor the continued prohibition of all public employee strikes,
primarily because strikes distort the political process by vesting excessive
power in unions in relation to other special interest groups. 180 It has,
174. See id. at 16. Admittedly, there is a significant difference between the enactment of a
charter provision as in San Francisco Fire Fighters and the enactment of an ordinance by the
local government as in Huntington Beach. The impact on public employee relations may be the
same in both cases, however. The only difference is that the electorate enact the charter
provisions, while the elected representatives enact the ordinances. See id. at 13.
175. Compare 18 Cal. 3d at 26-27, 553 P.2d at 1143, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 671 with 18 Cal. 3d at
28-29, 553 P.2d at 1144, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 672 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
176. Burton & Krider, supra note 42, at 427.
177. Burton & Krider, supra note 42, at 427.
178. See Burton & Krider, supra note 42, at 427.
179. See Burton & Krider, supra note 42, at 427-32.
180. H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 167 (1971).
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however, become academic to speak of the right of public employees to
strike. Strikes by both essential and nonessential employees are occurring at
an increased rate despite their illegality.' 8 ' Recognizing this, a majority of
states provide arbitration as an alternative to strikes.'8 2 Most of these
arbitration laws are designed to prevent strikes by municipal employees
whose services are so essential that a strike could not be tolerated.
18 3
Although disputed by its opponents,' 84 most evidence suggests that compul-
sory arbitration has been successful in avoiding public employee strikes.'
1 85
A statewide policy that mandates arbitration is premised on the notion that
strikes by essential local employees should be avoided because of their
impact on neighboring communities. This postulates a need for state regula-
tion to avert the impact' 86 that results when a city decides to endure a public
employee strike. 187 Furthermore, the state has an interest in protecting its
property located in the struck area. 188 Thus, a compelling position is pre-
sented for state legislation aimed at reducing the incidence of essential
employee strikes. This position weakens, however, when it is used to
support a state arbitration law aimed at avoiding strikes by nonessential local
employees. 189 The impact on neighboring communities, or the state general-
181. See notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text supra.
182. See note 15 supra.
183. See note 47 supra.
184. The opponents of interest arbitration typically claim support in the Australian experi-
ence with arbitration and to the Montreal firefighters strike in 1969 and 1974. Speaking of the
Australian experience, Professors Bok and Dunlop noted:
In Australia, where arbitration is widely used, strikes are more serious than in most
other industrial democracies where free collective bargaining prevails. While no
exact parallels can be drawn between two countries, the Australian experience
clearly demonstrates that compulsory arbitration does not automatically do away
with strikes, or even reduce them to minimal proportions.
D. BOK, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 240 (1970). For a discussion of the Australian
experience with arbitration, see Morris, supra note 2, at 439-56. The Montreal firefighter strike
of 1974 allegedly was in reaction to an arbitration award believed by the public employees to be
too low. See Burton & Krider, supra note 42, at 433-34. Compare Arnold, supra note 23, at 37
with Polland, supra note 17, at 46.
185. See Polland, supra note 17, at 46-49. The author of a study of New York's three year
experience with arbitration refused to draw the conclusion that the absence of strikes indicated
that the procedure was an effective strike deterrent. But see T. KOCHAN, R. EHRENBERG, J.
BADERSCHNEIDER, T. JICK & M. MIRONI, AN EVALUATION OF IMPASSE PROCEDURES FOR POLICE
AND FIREFIGHTERS IN NEW YORK STATE: A SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (1976), reprinted in 687 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. E-1 (BNA).
186. For a discussion of the impact upon the public and the city from strikes by essential
employees, see Polland, supra note 17, at 5-10.
187. See note 52 supra. See Polland, supra note 17, at 6-8. The possibility that a municipali-
ty may prefer to endure rather than to succumb to the pressures from a strike by essential
employees is not contrived. In September 1975 when the Berkeley, California firefighters
walked off the job over a demand for a 16.5% wage and benefit increase, the city council
decided to endure the strike, which lasted 25 days. The strike resulted in an agreement to terms
that were closer to the city's bargaining position than that of the employees. Shortly after the
strike started, the mayor declared a state of emergency and requested support from the State
Division of Forestry. The Governor also sent firefighters from University of California cam-
puses to protect the state university property in Berkeley. Finally, the city of Berkeley was
required to obtain aid from neighboring communities. This situation illustrates both the interest
of the state in preventing essential service interruptions and the impact that a strike by essential
service employees can have on neighboring communities. For a day-by-day account of the
strike, see Berkeley Firefighters' 25-Day Strike, 27 CAL. PUB. EMP. REL. 43 (1975).
188. See note 187 supra.
189. In City of Hermiston v. Employment Relations Board, - Or. App. -, -, 557 P.2d
681, 685 (1976), the Oregon Court of Appeals stated: "The interdependency point is well taken;
192
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ly, of a strike by street sweepers or secretaries appears remote when
compared to the impact resulting from a strike by firefighters or police in the
same city. Thus, this comment suggests that while an arbitration law aimed
at averting essential employee strikes addresses a statewide concern; one
aimed at nonessential employee strikes does not.
The Oregon Court of Appeals recently employed this analysis. °90 The
Oregon public employee relations law, 91 which includes a provision for
arbitration, 192 is intended peacefully to resolve disputes with all local em-
ployees. After rejecting the interest of the state in avoiding disruptions193 by
nonessential employees and finding the law inseverable, 194 the court held
that with the "possible exception of statutes directly controlling strikes,"
the entire law was inapplicable to charter cities.195 The court noted that "the
interdependency point may prove too much, because it could rapidly be
carried to an extreme that would leave nothing within the exclusive control
of the home rule cities and counties." 196 The Oregon court reached its
conclusion by weighing the interest of the state against the city in regulating
labor relations. 1
97
When the California Supreme Court decided that "[l]abor relations are [a
matter] of . . .statewide concern" 198 in Professional Firefighters, it ex-
amined a law that applied only to firefighters and that did not provide for
arbitration. 199 Therefore, it does not follow from the Professional Firefigh-
ters court ruling that an arbitration law should be binding on charter cities.
Thus, if a statewide compulsory arbitration law is aimed at nonessential
employees, it appears that it should not stand because the state's interest will
not outweigh that of the municipalities'. The applicability of a state arbitra-
tion law aimed at the essential employees of a charter city, however, will
depend on the extent of the interest of the state in the other two aspects of the
arbitration process: the scope of arbitration and the selection of the arbit-
rator.
C. The Scope of Arbitration
The crux of the problems presented by arbitration is that while the
decision to avoid strikes by essential employees is arguably a matter of state
concern, the substance of the disputes within the scope of arbitration is
but at least for nonvital services it is insignificant as a state interest. The possibility of water-
meter readers, secretaries or groundskeepers being hastily summoned from one community to
another to replace strikers is simply too remote." Id.
190. - Or. App. at -, 557 .P.2d at 681 (1976).
191. OR. REv. STAT. §§243.650-.782 (1974).
192. OR. Rav. STAT. §243.742 (1974).
193. - Or. App. at -, 557 P.2d at 685.
194. See id. at -, 557 P.2d at 683-84.
195. Id. at-, 557 P.2d at 685-86.
196. Id. at-, 557 P.2d at 685.
197. Id. at-, 557 P.2d at 684.
198. 60 Cal. 2d 276, 295, 384 P.2d 158, 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 841 (1963).
199. CAL. LAB. CODE §§1960-1963.
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typically of municipal concern.200 It would not be feasible to allow charter
cities the discretion to determine which of the disputed issues could be
submitted to the arbitrator since this would frustrate the purpose of a
compulsory arbitration law.201 Not only would strikes probably result to
induce agreement* on the issues not submitted to arbitration, 20 2 this lack of
uniformity would bring chaos to the administration of a statewide law.
20 3
Therefore, the courts should compare the competing interests concerning
each element of the arbitration process in order to decide whether the entire
process primarily reflects a state or municipal interest. 204
In City of Pasadena v. Charleville,205 a contractor was not permitted to
employ aliens to erect a fence around the chartered city's reservoir. The
California Supreme Court ruled that the paying and hiring of the employees
was a municipal affair and was not subject to a general law specifying the
prevailing wage rates for public works. 206 When the court considered the
applicability of a general law that prohibited the employment of aliens by
contractors of public works, 207 however, it reached a different result. The
court reasoned that the Alien Labor Law represented a "wise and benefi-
cient state policy''208 favoring the employment of citizens over aliens on
public works. The court concluded that the contractor, while free to set
wage rates, was prohibited by the general law from employing aliens.
20 9
This case suggests that the same subject may be a municipal affair for one
purpose but not for another. 210 Thus, while the state interest in avoiding
200. A frequent subject of bargaining and of arbitration is wages. In Bishop v. City of San
Jose, I Cal. 3d 56,460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969), the California Supreme Court held that
a chartered city was not subject to a state prevailing wage law in compensating its employees.
Hence, the court ruled, in effect, that the setting of local employee wage rates is a municipal
affair. See Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456, 461,56 P. 53, 55 (1899) (held the determination of
police and firemen's salaries to be a municipal affair); CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5(b)(4).
201. If the governing body of the city retains control over the matters within the scope of
arbitration and unilaterally establishes policy concerning each issue, the result is counter-
productive to a system of collective bargaining and provides no role for an arbitrator. Hence,
under such a system, arbitration is pointless.
202. Proponents of arbitration argue that there must be some form of compulsion in the
bargaining system to induce agreement and thereby make the negotiations meaningful. Arbitra-
tion, they claim, provides this compulsion. With neither arbitration nor the right to strike,
public employees are left to "collective begging." See Davis & Reno, supra note 23, at 24.
203. The Professional Fire Fighters court weighed heavily the concern of the legislature for
a statewide uniform labor relations policy to avoid labor strife. 60 Cal. 2d at 295, 384 P.2d at
169, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
204. So long as the matter is not exclusively a municipal affair, then the state may regulate it
through its general laws if the matter can be shown to be primarily a state affair. See id. at 294-
95, 384 P.2d at 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
205. 215 Cal. 384, 10 P.2d 745 (1932).
206. Id. at 389, 10 P.2d at 746-47.
207. CAL. STATS. 1931, c. 398, at 913.
208. 215 Cal. at 399, 10 P.2d at 751.
209. Id. at 398, 10 P.2d at 750.
210. Professors Sato and Van Alstyne suggest a court's determination of whether a matter
is of statewide or municipal concern depends upon the scope of judicial focus in light of the
subject matter considered. See S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAw 232 (1970). The Professional Fire Fighters court noted that no case relied upon by
defendent held that:
all matters connected with public employment in a chartered city are exclusively
municipal affairs in which the state had no concern. Each deals with a specific phase
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strikes by essential employees may be sufficient to overcome the municipal-
ity's interest in controlling its local personnel affairs, the state interest aimed
at nonessential employees may not. The California courts have also been
alert to the extent local policies will have an impact beyond the boundaries
of the city.211 For example, in sustaining the application of a general law
imposing liability on chartered cities for the negligent operation of its
vehicles, a California Court of Appeal reasoned that the operation of the
vehicles of the city on its streets endangered not only its residents, but
visiting motorists and pedestrians as well.21 2
In Ector v. City of Torrance,213 the California Supreme Court held that a
state statute prohibiting city residency requirements214 was not binding on a
charter city.215 The holding was based on a strict reading of the California
constitutional provision that grants charter cities plenary authority to pre-
scribe in their charters the qualifications of their employees. 21 6 The Ector
decision appears to indicate that the legislature may not interfere with
municipal affairs that are specifically enumerated in the constitution. 217 The
Ector holding is, however, limited to cases in which the matter sought to be
controlled by the state is specifically provided for in the constitution. By
requiring charter cities to submit their employee disputes to compulsory and
binding arbitration, the state would not be dictating the "qualifications" for
charter city employees, as it attempted in Ector. Rather, the state would
only direct the procedure to be followed for the determination of the terms
and conditions of employment for the employees of the cities. Thus, the
constitutional provision, which classifies certain matters as "municipal
of city employment, and each holds that the phase there under consideration is a
municipal affair.
60 Cal. 2d 276, 291, 384 P.2d 158, 167, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 839 (1963). Referring to City of
Pasadena and Adams v. Wolff, 84 Cal. App. 2d 435, 190 P.2d 665 (1948), the court stated that
each case held that:
The "hiring of employees generally" and "the hiring and paying of municipal employ-
ees" is generally a municipal affair. Neither denies the proposition that there may be
other phases of public employment that are of state concern.
60 Cal. 2d at 291, 384 P.2d at 167, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
211. In Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766,336 P.2d
514 (1959), the California Supreme Court ruled that the charter city could not require the
telephone company to obtain a franchise prior to using the streets of the city for telephone lines
because of the potential impact this local policy could have on interstate and foreign communi-
cations. Hence, because local policy would have an extra-territorial impact, the matter was of
state concern.
212. Lossman v. City of Stockton, 6 Cal. App. 2d 324, 332, 44 P.2d 397, 401 (1935).
213. 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973).
214. CAL. GOv'T CODE §50083.
215. See 10 Cal. 3d at 133, 514 P.2d at 435, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
216. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5. The San Francisco Fire Fighters court emphasized the
"plenary" nature of the constitutional authority granted to charter cities. I Civ. No. 38823
(filed and certified for publication Dec. 14, 1977) at 7-8.
217. The Ector court stated:
[Tihis is not the usual case in which the courts are without constitutional guidance in
resolving the question whether a subject of local regulation is a'municipal affair"and
hence within the general home rule power vested in charter cities by subdivision (a)
of section 5, article XI, of the Constitution .... Here we have the benefit of a
specific directive in subdivision (b) of that section, which grants "plenary authority"
to charter cities to prescribe in their charters the "_qualifications" of their employees.
10 Cal. 3d at 132, 514 P.2d at 434-35, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 850-51 (footnotes omitted).
218. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5.
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affairs,''218 will serve the court as a guide219 as it seeks to weigh the
competing interests of the state and the charter city.
Although the previous rulings of the California courts suggest that matters
typically within the scope of arbitration, such as the setting of wage rates,
are municipal affairs, 220 in making this determination, the courts will also
consider the purpose of the state for the general law as well as the potential
impact on the state from leaving the matter in the city's control. Therefore,
the courts may conclude, as they have with respect to other aspects of public
employee labor relations, 22' that a statewide compulsory arbitration law is
not an infringement on home rule but is designed only to provide a uniform
procedure for the settlement of essential employee disputes. Thus, the courts
are apt to follow the Professional Firefighters court's reasoning, where the
court stated:
The total effect of all this legislation was not to deprive local
government. . . of the right to manage and control its fire depart-
ments but to create uniform fair labor practices throughout the
state. As such, the legislation may impinge upon local control to a
limited extent, but it is nonetheless a matter of state concern.
222
The final, and potentially decisive, consideration for the court in determining
whether a legislative mandate for arbitration will be binding on charter cities
concerns the procedure for selecting the arbitrator who will advance the
purpose of the state by deciding matters of local concern.
D. Selecting the Arbitrator
The California Constitution prohibits the legislature from delegating to
any private person or body the power to perform municipal functions.
223
The purpose for this provision is to prevent the legislature from controlling
"purely local matters" by delegating municipal functions to its own special
commissions.224 The California Supreme Court has upheld delegations to
special commissions" 'if they either fulfill a more than local purpose, under
219. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, §13, which was added in 1970 at the same time as the new
Section 5 language, provides in part:
The provisions of Sections . . .4, and 5 of this Article relating to matters affecting
the distribution of powers between the Legislature and cities and counties, including
matters affecting supersession, shall be construed as a restatement of all related
provisions of the Constitution in effect immediately prior to the effective date of this
amendment, and as making no substantive change.
220. See Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456, 461, 56 P. 53, 55 (1899).
221. See cases cited at note 141 supra.
222. 60 Cal. 2d at 294-95, 384 P.2d at 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
223. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §11(a) provides:
The Legislature may not delegate to a private person or body power to make,
control, appropriate, supervise or interfere with county or municipal corporation
improvements, money, or property, or to levy taxes or assessments, or perform
municipal functions.
224. In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, 87, 88 P. 270, 277 (1906).
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the "larger municipality" doctrine, or promote as a "statewide pur-
pose." ' "225
The prohibition against delegations of legislative power to private per-
sons or bodies has presented a difficult problem for other state courts whose
constitutions contain provisions similar to California's. In 1962, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held in Erie Firefighters Local 293 v. Gardner,
226
that the power to fix municipal salaries was a purely municipal function and
was not delegable to a board of conciliators. 227 Erie Firefighters was short-
lived, however, since a subsequent constitutional amendment explicitly
permitted the delegation to third parties who resolve public employee
disputes or grievances. 228 The South Dakota Supreme Court also ruled that
the state constitutional provision 229 prohibited delegation of control over
municipal functions to a private person or commission, and thus invalidated
the state arbitration law. 230 The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that since
arbitrators merely execute and do not make law, their actions are administra-
tive in character and thus do not result in an unlawful delegation. 231 The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island took a novel approach to the problem. The
court reasoned that Rhode Island's constitutional provision 232 was aimed at
precluding delegations of legislative power to private individuals, but since
the arbitrator "is vested by law with a portion of the sovereignty of the
state," 233 the delegation was valid.234 This approach has been criticized by
225. People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 500, 487 P.2d 1193,
1206, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 566 (1971) (quoting from Comment, San Francisco Bay:Regulation for
its Protection and Development, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 728, 762 (1967)).
226. 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 327 (1961), aff'd, 406 Pa. 395, 178 A.2d 691 (1962).
227. Id. at 334-35, aff'd, 406 Pa. 395, 178 A.2d 691 (1962).
228. PA. CONST. art. III., §20 (§31 when amended, renumbered on May 16, 1967) provides
in part:
Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation or any other provision of the Constitution,
the General Assembly may enact laws which provide that the findings of panels or
commissions, selected and acting in accordance with law for the adjustment or
settlement of grievances or disputes or for collective bargaining between policemen
and firemen and their public employers shall be binding upon all parties and shall
constitute a mandate to the head of the political subdivision which is the employer, or
to the appropriate officer of the Commonwealth if the Commonwealth is the employ-
er, with respect to matters which can be remedied by administrative action, and to the
lawmaking body of such political subdivision or of the Commonwealth, with respect
to matters which require legislative action, to take the action necessary to carry out
such findings.
In Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
unanimously endorsed the state's compulsory arbitration law.
229. S.D. CONST. art. III, §26 provides in part:
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or
association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with. . . or to perform any
municipal functions whatever.
230. City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters, Local 814, - S.D. -, -,234 N.W.2d
35, 38 (1975).
231. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 299-300 (Wyo.
1968).
232. R. I. CONST. art. IV, §2 provides in part: "The legislative power, under this Constitu-
tion, shall be vested in two houses, the one to be called the senate, the other the house of
representatives . ... "
233. City of Warwick v. Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 116, 256 A.2d 206, 210
(1969).
234. Id. at 117, 256 A.2d 211.
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commentators 235 and courts2 6 alike. Nevertheless, this "sovereign arbit-
rator" approach was recently followed by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts .237
Therefore, this comment suggests that the constitutional prohibition
against the delegation of power to private persons, over municipal functions
can be avoided by either making the arbitrator politically accountable or by
determining that arbitration involves an overriding state interest. 238 If,
however, the arbitrator is not made politically accountable, and reliance is
placed exclusively on the interest of the state in averting essential employee
strikes for binding charter cities to the state arbitration law, a more funda-
mental problem emerges. This approach, which would vest policymaking
authority in nonpolitically accountable arbitrators, is repugnant to our notion
of representative government.
The significance of requiring that legislative decisions, which relate to
matters of municipal concern, be made by politically accountable persons
should not be limited to charter cities. It appears that the desire for represen-
tative local government is shared by citizens of chartered cities and general
law cities alike. Thus, while the technicalities of whether a chartered city is
bound by a statewide arbitration law may be overcome by demonstrating an
overriding state interest, any arbitration law should not be binding on any
city if it intrudes on the representative character of local government. Thus,
the unlawful delegation doctrine, and its relationship to the concern for
preserving representative government will next be examined as a basis for
requiring political accountability for decisions that affect the citizens of all
municipalities.
THE UNLAWFUL DELEGATION DOCTRINE AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT
The representative character of government has been preserved by a
doctrine that prohibits the delegation of legislative power to persons who are
not politically accountable. 239 The justification for the nondelegation doc-
trine stems from the representative nature of the state legislature. As the
235. See McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolu-
tion of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 1206-07 (1972).
236. City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 397 (Me. 1973). The
court found this reasoning "to be tautological." Id. One Michigan Supreme Court Justice
commented: "Such nominalistic reasoning both begs the question and reduces the analysis of
the issue to a reason-free debate over labels." Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of
Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 249, 231 N.W.2d 226, 232 (1975).
237. Town of Arlington v. Board of Concil. and Arb., - Mass.-,-, 352 N.E.2d 914,920
(1976). The court reasoned that "a person may be deemed a public official where he is fulfilling
duties which are public in nature .... ." Id.
238. See generally A. VAN ALSTYNE, BACKGROUND STUDY RELATING TO ARTICLE XI:
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 327-29 (prepared for the California Constitutional Revision Commission;
undated).
239. See S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
34-35 (1975).
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people's representative, the legislative body may not insulate itself from the
electorate by explicitly delegating its legislative function.2' In Kugler v.
Yocum 241 the Califorhia Supreme Court affirmed that the nondelegation
doctrine applies to local legislative bodies and announced that it is "well
established in California." 2 42 The court explained that this doctrine
rests upon the premise that the legislative body must itself effec-
tively resolve the truly fundamental issues.. It cannot escape re-
sponsibility by explicitly delegating that function to others or by
failing to establish an effective mechanism to assure the proper
implementation of its policy decisions.
243
Once the legislature resolves the "truly fundamental issues," it may
delegate the implementation of its policy to a third party, so long as the
delegation is accompanied by safeguards sufficient to prevent an abuse of
the delegatee's discretion. 2" It is, therefore, necessary to examine the
aspects of the arbitration process to determine if the "truly fundamental
issue" is resolved by the legislature prior to the delegation of legislative
power245 to the arbitrator and to determine if the delegation is accompanied
by sufficient safeguards. This examination must be prefaced, however, by a
determination that the legislative body is permitted to delegate to arbitrators,
the authority to make final and binding decisions on issues that the municip-
ality and its employees have been unable to resolve.
A. Authority to Delegate Legislative Power
A condition that must precede every valid delegation of legislative power
240. Professor Ehmke suggests that the rule prohibiting the delegation of legislative power
is grounded in Locke's doctrine of consent and the consent-trust relationship between the
people and their elected representatives. See Ehmke, "Delegata Potestas Non Potest De-
legari," A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 50, 57-60 (1961).
Professor Jaffe has stated that the rule is simply a "convenient legal formula to express the
underlying thought of Locke that 'the legislature neither must nor can transfer the power of
making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have.'" L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 54 (1965) (quoting from J. LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §142).
241. 69 Cal. 2d 371, 445 P.2d 303, 71 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1968).
242. Id. at 375, 445 P.2d at 305, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
243. Id. at 376-77, 445 P.2d at 306, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 690 (emphasis added).
244. Id. at 376, 445 P.2d at 306, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 690. See also Warren v. Marion County,
222 Or. 307, 313-15, 353 P.2d 257, 261-62 (1960); Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative
Power, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 359, 561 (1947).
245. The distinction between the exercise of legislative power and administrative power
appears esoteric at best. The Younger court termed the distinction "irrelevant." 5 Cal. 3d 480,
505, 487 P.2d 1193, 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 569 (1971). Several relevant doctrines, however,
depend on the distinction, such as the scope of initiative and referendum power. See text
accompanying notes 302-304 infra. For example, it is well settled in California that the setting
of public employee wage rates is an exercise of legislative power. See Bagley v. City of
Manhattan Beach, 18 Cal. 3d 22, 25, 553 P.2d 1140, 1142, 132 Cal. Rptr. 668, 670 (1976). One
factor that may be useful in making the distinction is the nature of the evidence examined by the
arbitrator. In resolving the particular issue, consideration should be given to whether the
arbitrator examines adjudicative or legislative facts in coming to his or her conclusion. If the
matter involves facts that are general and do not concern the immediate parties, the arbitrator is
examing legislative facts. Alternatively, if the examination focuses on matters concerning the
parties exclusively, he or she will rely on adjudicative facts. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TEXT §15.03 (1972); C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §1.02 (1972).
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is that the delegator must have the authority to make the delegation. 246 This
prefatory authority is present when the origin of the legislative power is with
the delegator. 247 A charter city derives most of its legislative power from the
state constitution248 and as the original recipient, the city possesses the
authority to delegate this power. 49 The delegatee of legislative power,
however, may not subdelegate without express authorization from the origi-
nal delegator. 250 Thus, since a general law city derives most2 51 of its
legislative power from the state legislature in the form of a delegation,2 52 the
city, which holds this power in the nature of a public trust,253 may not
delegate this power without express authorization from the legislature. 25
4
Since California does not presently have legislation mandating interest
arbitration, 255 a general law city must have express authorization from the
246. See California School Emps. Ass'n v. Personnel Comm'n, 3 Cal. 3d 139, 144,474 P.2d
436, 439, 89 Cal. Rptr. 620, 623 (1970). The rule is broadly stated in 2 E. MCQUILLAN,TiE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. §10.39 at 843.45 (3d ed. 1966), which states:
[The principle is fundamental and of universal application that public powers con-
ferred upon a municipal corporation and its officers and agents cannot be delegated
to others, unless so authorized by the legislature or charter. In every case where the
law imposes a duty upon an officer in relation to a matter of public interest, he cannot
delegate it to others, as by submitting it to arbitration. (Emphasis added; footnotes
omitted).
247. Legislative power originates with the people. See Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976); Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 146, 550 P.2d 1001,
1014, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 478 (1976). When the people confer that power on their representa-
tives, those representatives may delegate that legislative power when it is channeled through
sufficient standards, Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal. 2d 371, 375-76, 445 P.2d 303, 306, 71 Cal. Rptr.
687, 690 (1968), and so long as the legislature resolves the "truly fundamental issues," prior to
making the delegation, Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 65
Cal. 2d 349, 369, 420 P.2d 735, 748, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23, 36 (1966). Thus the legislature is
empowered to delegate legislative power because ther conferral of the power by the people was
primary. In comparison, those legislative powers that are directly conferred upon a charter city
by the constitution, see CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5, may also be delegated by the city through a
charter amendment, see Fire Fighters Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 622 n.13,
526 P.2d 971, 981 n.13, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 517 n.13 (1974), but may not be delegated without
specific authorization from the charter, see San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City &
County of San Francisco, 68 Cal. App. 3d 896, 901, 137 Cal. Rptr. 607, 609 (1977). Similarly,
since a general law city has only those powers expressly conferred upon it by the legislature, or
the constitution, Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach, 65 Cal. 2d 13, 20, 415 P.2d 769, 773, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 881, 885 (1966), it may not delegate this power without express authorization from the
delegator of the power, Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach, 18 Cal. 3d 22, 24, 553 P.2d 1140,
1141, 132 Cal. Rptr. 668, 669 (1976). Thus, where the power is conferred upon a legislative
body, it is empowered to delegate it, but when that power is delegated to it, it may not make a
delegation unless authorization is granted by the delegator.
248. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5.
249. Cf. 18 Cal. 3d at 27 n.1, 553 P.2d at 1143 n.l, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 671 n,l The Bagley
court distinguished the valid delegation to an arbitrator in the Vallejo charter from the invalid
attempted delegation by the Manhattan Beach proposed initiative measure on the basis that
Vallejo is a charter city while Manhattan Beach is a general law city.
250. See id. at 24-25, 553 P.2d at 1141-42, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 669-70. When the state delegates
legislative power to a general law city, an attempted redelegation by the city requires statutory
authorization from the state because the power is held by the city in the nature of a public trust.
Id.
251. A general law city derives its "police power" from the constitution, CAL. CONST. art.
XI, §7, which provides that, "[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local,
police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws."
252. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§34300-45345.
253. California School Emps. Ass'n v. Personnel Comm'n, 3 Cal. 3d 139, 144,474 P.2d 436,
439, 89 Cal. Rptr. 620, 623 (1970).
254. See note 250 supra.
255. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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state in order to delegate its legislative power to an arbitrator. Not finding
this authorization present, the California Supreme Court in Bagley v. City of
Manhattan Beach256 ruled that a general law city lacks the authority to
provide for binding interest arbitration. 257 Since the state legislature is the
source of the wage-setting authority exercised by general law cities,2 58 the
legislature thus possesses the power to delegate the exercise of this authority
to an arbitrator to break the bargaining deadlock between the city and its
employee representatives. As was previously suggested, 259 the legislature
256. 18 Cal. 3d 22, 553 P.2d 1140, 132 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1976).
257. In Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach, 18 Cal. 3d 22, 553 P.2d 1140, 132 Cal. Rptr. 668
(1976), the California Supreme Court was squarely faced with whether a general law city
possessed the authority to delegate legislative power, which was delegated to it by the state, to
an arbitrator. The issue arose when the defendant, City of Manhattan Beach, refused to place
on the ballot an initiative measure providing for compulsory and binding arbitration of firefigh-
ter employee disputes. Id. at 24, 553 P.2d at 1141, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 669. The proposed initiative
petition is reproduced in the court of appeal opinion. Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach, 123
Cal. Rptr. 908, 909-10 (1975). The court ruled that in the absence of statutory authorization, the
city lacked the power to make the delegation because the city held the power to set wages,
which power originated from the state legislature, in the nature of a public trust. 18 Cal. 3d at
24, 553 P.2d at 1141, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 669. Because it was unable to discover any authorization
from the state legislature for the proposed delegation to an arbitrator, the Bagley court did not
reach the issue of whether the delegation was otherwise proper. Id. Thus, the majority of the
court neither examined whether the proposed delegation to an arbitrator constituted a resolu-
tion of the "fundamental policy issue" by the legislative body, nor the sufficiency of safe-
guards in the proposed delegation.
The propriety of the proposed delegation was, however, examined by Justices Mosk and
Tobriner who joined dissenting, in Bagley. Id. at 27, 553 P.2d at 1143, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 671. The
Bagley dissenters contended that the power to fix wage rates held by the Manhattan Beach City
Council was not unlawfully delegated to an arbitrator. Id. The minority reasoned that since the
arbitrator's award must be implemented by ordinance, the proposed initiative would not divest
the city government of its power under Section 36506 since the "-arbitrator's award could be
implemented only by a council ordinance." Id. -at 28, 553 P.2d at 1144, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 672
(Mosk, J., dissenting). Thus, the city council would not be delegating its power to an arbitrator
because it retained the power to enact the ordinance. The minority's reasoning is, however,
inconsistent with the provision of the proposed initiative, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10, as well as the
California Supreme Court's decision in Glendale City Employees'Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 15
Cal. 3d 328, 540 P.2d 609, 124 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1975).
The proposed Manhattan Beach initiative provided that the arbitrator's award "shall be final
and binding on all parties," 132 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10, and that the city "shall take whatever
action is necessary to carry out and effectuate the award." Id. In Glendale, the court ruled that
defendant city was obligated to enact a new salary ordinance to implement the agreement
contained in the memorandum of understanding negotiated with the employee representatives.
15 Cal. 3d at 343, 540 P.2d at 619, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 523. The court explained that the legislative
act of fixing salaries occurred when the memorandum of understanding was negotiated and
approved. Id. at 345, 540 P.2d at 620, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 524. Thus, enacting the implementing
ordinance became a ministerial act and since the plaintiff employees had no other adequate
remedy, the court ruled that the memorandum of understanding would be enforced by issuance
of a writ of mandamus. Id.
The rationale of the Glendale court is applicable to the arbitration process. When arbitration
is used to resolve an impasse over employee compensation, the legislative act of fixing
employee wage rates is performed by the arbitrator. See note 245 supra. Walker v. County of
Los Angeles, 55 Cal. 2d 626, 634, 361 P.2d 247, 251, 12 Cal. Rptr. 671, 675 (1961). For the
arbitration process to achieve its strike avoidance effect on essential employees, however, the
arbitrator's decision must be binding. Thus, the employees affected by an arbitrator's award
have no other adequate remedy but to seek a writ of mandamus enforcing the award. It appears,
therefore, that the legislative power is in reality transferred from the municipal government to
the arbitrator, thereby leaving the city council with the ministerial duty to implement the award.
258. CAL. Gov'T CODE §36506. Since a charter city does not require a specific grant of
authority from the state, see City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 98, 308 P.2d 1, 3-4
(1957); Bruce v. Civil Service Bd., 6 Cal. App. 2d 633, 636, 45 P.2d 419, 421 (1935), it has the
authority to make a delegation of the power which it receives from the constitution if the matter
is a municipal affair, and hence not subject to conflicting general laws.
259. See text accompanying notes 118-120 supra.
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may delegate the exercise of a chartered city's wage-setting power only if
the delegation involves an overriding statewide concern. Thus, the state
legislature is empowered to delegate legislative power to an arbitrator to
resolve issues that have reached an impasse with general law city employ-
ers. With respect to charter cities, however, whether the state is authorized
to direct the delegation of the charter city's legislative power to an arbitrator
will depend on whether arbitration is a matter of statewide concern. Once it
is determined that the legislature has the power to delegate the authority of a
city to an arbitrator, the propriety of the delegation depends on whether the
legislature resolves the "truly fundamental issues" and accompanies the
implementation of its policy with sufficient safeguards.
B. Legislature Must Resolve the "Truly Fundamental Issues"
Interest arbitration is in effect a delegation of power since it is a procedure
that substitutes an arbitrator's judgment for the judgment of the disputing
parties. Thus, the decision to arbitrate is equivalent to a decision to delegate
the power to decide those issues, which the parties are unable or unwilling to
resolve, lying within the scope of arbitration to an arbitrator. Therefore, it
must be determined whether the legislature is resolving the "truly funda-
mental issue" when it decides to avert strikes by essential employees by
delegating to an arbitrator the power to decide the issues in dispute.
The Bagley dissenters pragmatically stated that the fundamental issue
would be resolved by a legislative determination "that impasses in labor
disputes involving firefighters should be resolved not by the present adver-
sary method, with its potential for disruption of essential services, but by a
mutual reasoned appeal to an impartial arbitrator.' '26 Implicit in this state-
ment is the acknowledgement that an arbitrator would serve no useful
function if the legislative body were required initially to resolve every issue
within the scope of arbitration. Stated otherwise, if each disputed issue must
be resolved by the legislative body prior to arbitration, the arbitrator would
be simply effectuating the position of a party to the dispute and would,
therefore, not be impartial. Thus, the dissenters broadly interpreted the
meaning of "truly fundamental issue" so as not to frustrate the legislative
purpose of the arbitration process. This broad interpretation, however,
results in placing legislative power in the hands of a nonpolitically account-
able arbitrator.
261
The California Supreme Court's previous opinions suggest the direction it
will take when faced with whether broadly to interpret this prerequisite to a
260. 18 Cal. 3d at 31, 553 P.2d at 1146, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
261. The Bagley minority recognized that the arbitrator would not be politically responsible
to the electorate. This problem was solved for the dissenters, however, because the city was to
"share an equal role with the employees in selecting [the arbitrator]." 18 Cal. 3d at 33,553 P.2d
at 1147, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
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proper delegation. In City of Vallejo, a unanimous court declared that the
"state policy in California 'favors arbitration provisions in collective bar-
gaining agreements and recognizes the important part they play in helping to
promote industrial stabilization.' "262 The court then went out of its way to
place its imprimatur of constitutionality on the Vallejo arbitration provi-
sion.263 In Kugler, the court commented:
Doctrinaire legal concepts should not be invoked to impede the
reasonable exercise of legislative power. . .. Only in the event
of a total abdication of that power, through failure either to render
basic policy decisions or to assure that they are implemented as
made, will this court intrude on legislative enactment because it is
an 'unlawful delegation,' and then only to preserve the representa-
tive character of the process of reaching legislative decision.
264
Finally, the court has evidenced a willingness to encourage rather than
frustrate legislative innovations in public employee relations. 265 Thus, by
262. 12 Cal. 3d 608, 622, 526 P.2d 971, 980, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 516 (1974).
263. In City of Vallejo an amicus curiae argued that the MMB Act violates the constitution-
al prohibition against the delegation of power to perform municipal functions. CAL. CONST. art.
XI, §1 1(a). See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant City of Vallejo at 5-7, filed in I
Civ. No. 32,325, Fire Fighters Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971, 116
Cal. Rptr. 507 (1974). This would occur, the amicus urged, by including within the scope of
negotiation, and hence arbitration, matters that determine the nature of services the city
renders; determinations within the exclusive authority of the local elected officials. The court
responded by footnote, 12 Cal. 3d at 622 n.13, 526 P.2d 981 n.13, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 517 n.13,
noting that two other states (Rhode Island and Wyoming; see text accompanying notes 231-236
supra) had held arbitration constitutional and that no unlawful delegation of legislative power
would occur so long as the arbitrator proceeds within the provision of the city charter. The
footnote response was to an allegation that collective bargaining is an unlawful delega-
tion of legislative power to employee representatives. This argument has long ago succumbed to
a recognition of a need for communication and negotiation between public employers and their
employees. Thus, the dismissal by the court of the amicus' argument does not necessarily
reflect the court decision if it were faced with the same argument concerning arbitration-
where all control over the final decision is surrendered by the employer. Furthermore, the City
of Vallejo court footnote dictum suggests that legislative power was not even delegated to the
arbitrator. Rather, the Vallejo voters, by charter amendment, empowered the arbitrator to settle
disputes; they did not delegate to him this power. See note 247 supra. The United States
Supreme Court recently stated in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668, 672
(1976):
Under our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people, who can
delegate it to representative instruments which they create. . . . In establishing
legislative bodies, the people can reserve to themselves power to deal directly with
matters which might otherwise be assigned to the legislature.
This does not present any new discovery for California courts. In Spencer v. City of Alhambra,
44 Cal. App. 2d 75, 77, 111 P.2d 910, 912 (1941), the Second District Court of Appeal remarked:
It is a basic principle inherent in the American system of representative government,
as declared in article I, section 2 of our state Constitution, that "all political power is
inherent in the people. ... [I]t follows that the legislative power of the municipali-
ty resides in the people thereof. (emphasis added).
264. 69 Cal. 2d 371,384,445 P.2d 303, 311,71 Cal. Rptr. 687,695 (1968) (emphasis added).
265. Bagley demonstrates a clear concern by the court not to preempt legislative action by
prematurely ruling on the propriety of arbitration. Other indications of judicial eagerness
to avoid impeding legislative action aimed at resolving difficult public employee relations
problems are visible in the court's frequent application of private sector labor relations prece-
dents to public sector cases. For example, in City of Vallejo, the court concluded that "the
bargaining requirements of the National Labor Relations Act and cases interpreting them may
properly be referred to for such enlightenment as they may render in our interpretation of the
scope of bargaining under the Vallejo charter." 12 Cal. 3d at 617, 526 P.2d at 977, 116 Cal. Rptr.
at 513. In City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898, 534 P.2d 403, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 707 (1975), the California Supreme Court ruled that, as in the private sector, an employee
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narrowly interpreting the meaning of a "truly fundamental issue," it ap-
pears likely that the California courts will validate legislation that attempts
to solve the difficult problem of essential employee strike deterrence by use
of compulsory arbitration. Once the "truly fundamental issue" is resolved
by the decision of the legislature to avert strikes by essential employees by
delegating the authority to decide the disputed issues to an arbitrator, the
implementation of this policy must be accompanied by sufficient safeguards
to prevent an abuse of discretion by the arbitrator.
C. Safeguards
The Bagley minority identified several safeguards in the proposed
Manhattan Beach arbitration plan. 266 Typical of most compulsory interest
arbitration laws, these safeguards fall into three categories. The first cate-
gory includes provisions for judicial review of the arbitrator's decision.
267
Second, the proposed arbitration plan directs the arbitrator to consider the
city's ability to pay, as well as various economic indicators. 268 Last, the
procedure for selecting the arbitrator was considered to be a safeguard.
2 69
The proposed Manhattan Beach arbitration plan adopted the procedure for
judicial review of the arbitrator's decision contained in the California Arbi-
tration Act. 270 The scope of review under the Arbitration Act is very narrow.
The California courts have held that an arbitrator's decision could not be
assailed even though his or her determination was erroneous. 271 Further-
more, the arbitrator is the final judge of both fact and law and an award will
not be set aside for a mistake as to either.272 Nevertheless, the Arbitration
Act permits judicial review to determine if the arbitrator has exceeded his or
her authority. 273 This provision could permit the court to control the scope of
arbitration in order to isolate matters that should be left to the political
process. If a matter is properly within the scope of negotiation, a determina-
tion by the court to exclude it from the scope of arbitration would, however,
relations agreement induced by the coercion resulting from an employee strike, did not invali-
date the agreement. These cases appear to suggest that the courts, when possible, will make
every effort to support public employee relations legislation, rather than frustrate it.
The courts should also not ignore that the California Legislature has engaged in a thorough
study of the problems presented by public employee relations. See generally SENATE SELECT
COMMITrEE ON LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, To MEET AND CONFER: A
STUDY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR RELATIONS (1972).
266. See note 257 supra.
267. 18 Cal. 3d at 32, 553 P.2d at 1146, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§1280-1288.8. See Grodin, supra note 25, at 20-21. Professor
Grodin suggests that, because of the political nature of public sector interest arbitration, the
scope of judicial review of arbitral awards should be widened at least to assure that the
arbitrator has applied the legislatively mandated standards.
271. Interinsurance Exch. v. Bailes, 219 Cal. App. 2d 830, 836, 33 Cal. Rptr. 533, 537
(1963).
272. Frick v. Preston, 130 Cal. App. 290, 19 P.2d 836 (1933).
273. CAL. ClV. PROC. CODE §1286.2(d) provides that the court may vacate the award if it
determines that "[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected
without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted. .. ."
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create incongruent scopes, thereby impairing the strike avoidance value of
the arbitration process.
274
As was previously suggested, 275 the use of standards to guide an arbit-
rator's discretion, such as the city's ability to finance the award, tends to
complicate rather than resolve the political problems presented by the
arbitration process. This becomes particularly apparent when it is recog-
nized that the disputes typically presented to an arbitrator are not always
susceptible to the application of standards. The most frequent issues before
an arbitrator are those that increase the personnel costs of the municipali-
ty.276 These issues, such as wages and personnel benefits, are susceptible to
prior legislative guidance. While certain arbitrator discretion is inevitable,
and often necessary, standards may be established in advance of the dispute
to assure that the general policy of the legislature is achieved. For example,
by requiring the arbitrator to consider factors such as, the wages paid to
comparable employees in the community, the consumer price index or the
city's ability to pay, the legislature evinces a public policy. The policy is
that public employees should receive a wage that is comparable to similar
employees in the community, is sufficient to keep pace with inflation and is
affordable by the municipality. A decision by an arbitrator that is guided by
these standards effectuates this legislative policy. Thus, the legislature
remains politically accountable for this policy which the arbitrator imple-
ments by applying the legislature's standards.
When, however, the issue within the scope of the arbitrator's authority is
not subject to previously established legislative standards, the citizenry may
not legitimately hold the legislators accountable for the arbitration deci-
sion.27 7 Typically these issues involve important matters of social planning.
For example, the issue may call upon the arbitrator to determine how many
police officers will be assigned to patrol a particular neighborhood. This
issue directly relates to the safety of the officer's working conditions and is
apparently within the scope for bargaining and hence arbitration. The
principal standard, which is employed by a few states, to guide an arbitral
274. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
275. See text accompanying notes 80-85 supra.
276. Cf. T. KOCHAN, R. EHRENBERG, J. BADERSCHNEIDER, T. JICK & M. MIRONI, AN
EVALUATION OF IMPASSE PROCEDURES FOR POLICE AND FIREFIGHTERS IN NEW YORK STATE: A
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (1976), reprinted in 687
GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. E-1 (BNA) (disputes involving the employer's ability to pay were the
most likely to go to impasse and hence come before the arbitrator). The study suggested that the
New York Public Employee Relations Board work with the various state agencies to develop
"ability to pay" data about each community in order to help standardize the information
presented to neutrals. Id. at 18.
277. The community may certainly legitimately hold the state legislators accountable for
their decision to provide for compulsory interest arbitration. At present, the use of arbitration
appears to be favored by California citizens. A poll conducted by the Field Research Corpora-
tion in June 1977 revealed that 75.2 percent of those polled favor a system of compulsory
arbitration to settle police and firefighter disputes; 13.3 percent were opposed to such a plan;
and 11.6 percent had no opinion (copy of Field Research Corporation report on file at
Pacific Law Journal). See note 18 supra.
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decision of such an issue, is the "public interest." '278 The arbitrator is to
determine, in light of the evidence presented, what is in the public interest.
Few will dispute that arbitrators are conscientious persons who are dedicated
to furthering the public interest.27 9 The crux of the problem, however,
concerns the ability of the arbitration process to preserve the essential bond
between the formulation of public policy and the political accountability of
the local legislator. This bond is destroyed when nonpolitically accountable
arbitrators are allowed to formulate public policy. Nevertheless, courts have
been satisfied that the "public interest" standard sufficiently limits the
discretion of arbitrators to satisfy the requirement of safeguards for a valid
delegation of legislative power.
280
Another approach to limiting arbitrator discretion, which has become
increasingly popular in recent years, 281 is to limit the arbitrator to the
selection of the "final offer" of either of the parties to the dispute.282 In
addition, allegedly encouraging the bargaining process by discouraging
the frequent use of arbitration, 283 some commentators suggest that this
approach removes the arbitrator from the role of formulating social poli-
cy. 284 Although this approach does indeed severely limit the quantum of
278. IOWA CODE ANN. §20.22(9)(c) (West Supp. 1975) ("interests and welfare of the
public"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 §548.10(4) (West Supp. 1974) ("interest and welfare of the
public"). See also I F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 85 (1965) (a delegation involving
the public interest as a standard has been held to be sufficient to satisfy the requirement for
standards of the nondelegation doctrine).
279. Professor Grodin notes that, typically, arbitrators are conscientious and concerned
citizens. He states:
Most arbitrators are sensible people, constrained by feelings of responsibility to the
community and by a desire for continued acceptability. They are not likely to render
a decision they know or believe will bring financial ruin to a community or create a
disruptive political reaction. On the contrary, .... they seek consensus where it is
possible.
Grodin, supra note 25, at 13-4 (footnote omitted). The arbitration awards typically have not
been greatly different from the results of negotiated settlements. For example, a study that
examined Michigan's police and firefighter wages during periods prior to and after the enact-
ment of interest arbitration legislation in 1969 revealed that:
Even though there may have been wide fluctuations in wage increases in a given year,
the average annual percentage increase in both arbitration and nonarbitration rela-
tionships has not differed significantly. . . .[W]hen viewed over a period of time,
awarded wage increases do not appear to have been excessive relative to negotiated
settlements.
M. Bowers, A Study of Legislated Arbitration and Collective Bargaining in the Public Safety
Services in Michigan and Pennsylvania 185 (Jan. 1974) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at
Cornell University).
Arguably, while a private citizen arbitrator may not be politically responsible, he or she may
be responsible in fact."The arbitrator's good intentionslare not always well received by the
community, however. See Ayres, Firemen's Expensive Pact Award Stuns City, Oakland
Tribune, Feb. 19, 1975, §1, at 1, col. 2. See generally Rehmus, supra note 3, at 310-11.
280. See, e.g. Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 189, 255 A.2d 560, 563 (1969); State ex rel. Fire
Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 300 (Wyo. 1968).
281. See Morris, supra note 2, at 466.
282. There are generally two forms of final-offer arbitration: the total package type, in
which the arbitrator is restricted to the selection of either the employer's or employee's total
package of offers on all the issues; or the issue-by-issue type, in which the arbitrator is
permitted to select either of the parties' offer on each of the issues. There have been numerous
studies and commentaries on final-offer arbitration. E.g., J. STERN, supra note 19; Zack, Final
Offer Selection-Panacea or Pandora's Box, 19 N.Y.L. FORUM 567 (1974).
283. See Morris, supra note 2, at 465-69.
284. Cf. Polland, supra note 17, at 51 (final-offer often results in mediation-arbitration in
which the parties are encouraged to settle on their own thereby actually removing the arbitrator
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alternatives available to the arbitrator, 285 it does not address the problems
created when social policy is set by a nonpolitically accountable person.
Thus, this comment suggests that rather than attempting to force the "square
peg" of the public sector interest arbitration process into the existing
"round hole" requisites of the established nondelegation doctrine, the focus
should be placed on making the arbitrator politically accountable to the
community he or she will influence. Public sector interest arbitration is an
innovative, and apparently successful, 286 approach to a grave social and
political problem, and it deserves an opportunity to operate within our
representative form of government, rather than apart from it. Thus, efforts
should be directed at making arbitrators politically accountable to the com-
munities they will serve.
The nondelegation doctrine does not present a significant obstacle to the
application of a statewide compulsory and binding arbitration law in Califor-
nia. The first requisite for a valid delegation may be met because the state
legislature possesses the power to delegate legislative authority to an arbit-
rator since it is the source of this power for general law cities, 287 and it is
constitutionally empowered to effect legislation that deals with a matter of
statewide concern in the case of charter cities. 288 Since the California courts
have announced a policy favoring arbitration,289 it is unlikely that a legisla-
tive mandate for compulsory and binding interest arbitration will be judicial-
ly impeded by the argument that the legislature has failed to decide the
"truly fundamental issue." Thus, the second requisite for a valid delegation
will be met.
Only the requirement for sufficient safeguards may interfere with the
validity of the delegation. As was suggested,29° however, it is likely that the
typical standards will be sufficient for the court to sustain the validity of the
arbitration law. Thus, this comment suggests that the legislature should not
merely seek to satisfy the requisites of the existing "round hole" doctrines
in dealing with this complex political problem. Rather, the arbitration
process should be integrated into the political process by making the arbit-
rators politically accountable to the communities they will influence. The
lawmakers should adopt new approaches to satisfy the time tested and
proven need for representative government in our democratic society. The
procedure for selecting the arbitrator presents just such an opportunity.
from the decisionmaking process).
285. Although the tendency among arbitrators under a conventional system of arbitration
appears to be to "split the difference," they in fact have an infinite number of alternatives that
fall between the parties' last offer. Under a system of final-offer arbitration, however, the
arbitrator is limited to the selection of either the employer's final offer or the employee's final
offer.
286. See note 19 supra.
287. See note 252 and text accompanying notes 246-252 supra.
288. See text accompanying notes 120-242 supra.
289. Fire Fighters Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608,622,526 P.2d 971,980, 116
Cal. Rptr. 507, 516 (1974).
290. See text accompanying notes 266-294 supra.
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SELECTING THE ARBITRATOR
The concern over arbitrator selection is not whether a fair decision will
result, nor whether arbitration will achieve its purpose of avoiding essential
service interruptions. The concern rests on the need to keep continuing
political accountability fused with local policymaking in order to preserve
the representative character of government. The people must not be stripped
of control over the decisions of their elected representatives. When, howev-
er, policymaking is vested in a nonpolitically accountable arbitrator, whose
decision is final and binding on the community, the people are stripped of
their elemental power to reverse the decision by referendum. 291 Further-
more, the people have no justifiable political recourse against the legislative
body whose only fault was to reach a bargaining deadlock with its employ-
ees.
The California Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the importance of
preserving legislative power in the people. 292 It stated:
It is a fundamental tenet of the American system of representative
government that the legislative power of a municipality resides in
the people thereof, and that the right to exercise it has been
conferred by them upon duly chosen representatives. By the
enactment of initiative and referendum laws the people have sim-
ply withdrawn from the legislative body and reserved to them-
selves the right to exercise a part of their inherent legislative
power.
293
The difficulty in seeking to preserve the representative character of govern-
ment is not with convincing the courts that representative government is a
worthwhile objective; it is in providing the court with a sound basis for
judicial action. Historically, the United States Supreme Court has dismissed
claims founded on alleged intrusions on representative government as polit-
ical questions294 devoid of judicially manageable standards. 295 Hence, the
courts have not entertained these claims, but have referred the complainants
to the legislative branch. 296 Recently, however, two state supreme courts
examined their respective state arbitration laws on the purported constitu-
tional ground that the laws failed to provide for continuing political accoun-
tability.297 Only one of these courts was able to find support for its decision
291. CAL. CONSr. art IV, §1. In El Dorado Sherrif's Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 3 Civ.
No. 15, 465 (filed Aug. 20, 1976), the court stated: "The power of initiative and referendum is a
power reserved to the people, not a granted power, and as such is to be liberally construed in
order to uphold it whenever that can be done." (emphasis added).
292. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 146,550 P.2d 1001, 1014, 130 Cal. Rptr.
465, 478 (1976) (quoting from Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 513, 253 P. 932,935 (1927)).
293. 17 Cal. 3d at 146, 550 P.2d at 1014, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
294. E.g., Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608,612 (1937); Ohio exrel. Bryant v,
Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79-80. But see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
295. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964).
296. See Town of Arlington v. Board of Concil. & Arb., - Mass. -, -, 352 NE.2d 914,
921-22 (1976).
297. Greeley Police Union v. City Council, - Colo. -, -, 553 P.2d 790, 792 (1976);
Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229,241-42,231 N.W.2d 226,
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in a constitutional provision.298 There are, however, two potential constitu-
tional bases for judicial intervention to exact political accountability in the
arbitration process. The first basis for judicial intervention relies on preser-
vation of the people's elemental constitutional power of initiative and
referendum. 299 The second basis is the application of the "one person one
vote" principle300 in arbitrator selection.
While each of the constitutional principles30 1 may provide the basis for
judicial action, the concern for political accountability properly belongs in
the political forum. Therefore, the key question for the legislature is not to
determine what it can get away with, but what it ought to do.
A. The Power of Initiative and Referendum is Reserved in the People
The California Constitution explicitly reserves to the people the power of
initiative and referendum. 302 The scope of initiative and referendum is
limited to matters that are legislative in character303 and that are within the
legislative body's power of resolution.3°4 The California Legislature has
228 (1975). The Dearborn Justices were evenly split on the constitutionality of the arbitration
law. Two justices contended that the law was clearly unconstitutional while a third argued that
it was constitutional. The fourth justice stated that the law was constitutional only as applied in
this case, which was in a manner not intended by the legislature. Thus, it can be argued that the
arbitration law, as enacted, was held unconstitutional by the Michigan Supreme Court, al-
though this is not the precise holding since the divided supreme court decision had the effect of
affirming the lower court opinion, in which the law was held constitutional. Shortly after the
supreme court opinion, the Michigan Legislature amended the arbitration law, 1976 MICH. PUB.
Acrs 84, into conformity with Justice Williams' opinion.
298. The Greeley court held the arbitrator selection procedure violated article XXI, section
4 of the Colorado Constitution, which provides in part:
Every person having authority to exercise or exercising any public or governmental
duty, power or function, shall be an elective officer, or one appointed, drawn or
designated in accordance with law by an elective officer or officers, or by some board,
commission, person or persons legally appointed by an elective officer or officers,
each of which said elective officers shall be subject to the recall provision of the
constitution ....
COLO. CONST. art. XXI, §4.
299. CAL. CONST. art. IV, §1 provides: "The legislative power of this State is vested in the
California Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to
themselves the powers of initiative and referendum."
300. The concern of the U.S. Supreme Court for preserving the individual's right to vote
from dilution, has led to numerous cases in the 1960's in which the Court directed the
apportionment of legislative districts to bring them in line with the urban and rural conditions of
the mid-20th century. See generally Schattschneider, Urbanization and Reapportionment, 72
YALE L.J. 7 (1962). On the application of the "one person one vote" principle to local
government, see generally, Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on
Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 21 (1965).
301. The "one person one vote" principle is founded on the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
565-66 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962). See also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 17-18 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963).
302. CAL. CONST. art. IV, §1.
303. Wheelright v. County of Marin, 2 Cal. 3d 448, 457, 467 P.2d 537, 543, 85 Cal. Rptr.
809, 815 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 807 (1970); Valentine v. Town of Ross, 39 Cal. App. 3d
954, 957, 114 Cal. Rptr. 678, 680 (1974). Administrative or executive acts are outside the scope
of the referendum power. Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 129, 222 P.2d 225, 228 (1950). See
Comment, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1717
(1966).
304. Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 140, 277 P. 308, 311 (1929). See Note,
Judicial Limitations on the Initiative and Referendum in California Municipalities, 17 HASTINGS
L.J. 805, 813-15 (1966).
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provided for the power of initiative 30 5 and referendum, 306 in accordance with
the constitutional mandate, 307 to all counties and general law cities. Charter
cities may provide these powers in their charters.
30 8
The decision to mandate arbitration as the means for averting strikes by
essential employees is legislative in character and is, therefore, capable of
enactment by initiative or repeal by referendum. 309 The pertinent problem
arises once the state arbitration law is enacted and applied to the municipali-
ty. If the California courts follow the reasoning in Glendale, which permits
a court to direct the legislative enactment of an ordinance to effect a
memorandum of understanding that was approved by the city council,31 0 the
people will be unable to reverse an arbitration award because their power of
referendum will be lost. 311 For example, suppose the arbitrator awards the
firefighters a twenty percent pay raise. This arbitrator's decision involves
the setting of wage rates that has consistently been held to be an exercise of
legislative power.312 Once this power is exercised by the arbitrator, howev-
er, the legislative body is bound by the award. Thus, the people may not
reverse this decision because it does not meet the two requirements to fall
within the scope of their referendum power. Since the decision is legislative
in character, it satisfies the first requirement. It fails the second requirement,
however, because power over the decision was transferred from the local
legislative body to the arbitrator. Therefore, since the legislative body
subject to the people's initiative and referendum power may not alter the
arbitrator's award, neither may the people. Furthermore, since the arbitrator
is not a local officer, he or she is not subject to recall.313 Consequently, the
arbitration process is totally insulated from the community.
One way to avoid this potential abridgement of constitutional right to
referendum is expressly to provide, in the arbitration law, that the award is
binding on the city only if not reversed by a special election.3 14 This would
305. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§3709, 3711 (counties); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§4010, 4011 (cities).
306. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§3753, 3754 (counties); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§4051, 4055 (cities).
307. CAL. CONsT. art. II, §11.
308. CAL. CONST. art. II, §I1.
309. In Geiger v. Board of Supervisors, 48 Cal. 2d 832, 839, 313 P.2d 545, 549 (1957), the
California Supreme Court stated, "If essential governmental functions would be seriously
impaired by the referendum process, the courts, in construing the applicable constitutional and
statutory provisions will assume that no such result was intended." The argument could be
made that the repeal of a state interest arbitration law or of a local ordinance implementing an
arbitration award should not be within the scope of the referendum power because the repeal of
either law could result in a strike. Thus, the courts would be called upon to weigh the
advantages of the exercise of this power versus the impact of strikes on the community.
310. See note 257 supra.
311. See note 257 supra.
312. See Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach, 18 Cal. 3d 22, 25, 553 P.2d 1140, 1142, 132
Cal. Rptr. 668, 670 (1976).
313. CAL. CONST. art. II, §19 provides: "The Legislature shall provide for recall of local
officers. This section does not affect counties and cities whose charters provide for recall."
314. A similar approach is presently employed by the City of Englewood, Colorado. In that
city, public employer-employee bargaining impasses are submitted for resolution by a "Career
Service Board" composed of five local citizens; two appointed by the city council, two elected
by city employees, and these four then appoint the fifth member. The members of the board
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serve to place the final decisionmaking power with the people over the
specific matters decided by the arbitrator, but its exercise could be reserved
to issues whose community interest is such that their resolution should
properly be left to the political processes of the ballot box. Another way to
preserve the representative character of government is to make the arbitrator
politically accountable. Two problems are created by this approach. The
first is the level on which the "public arbitrators" should be selected. If they
are selected on a statewide basis, decisionmaking is removed from the
community that the arbitrator will affect. Further, an arbitrator from a
primarily urban area may not be aware of, and hence sensitive to, the
peculiar problems faced by a rural community and vice versa. On the other
hand, if the arbitrator is selected on the local level, public employee
confidence may drop as the arbitrator will be identified as a member of the
city's management team. This could frustrate rather than advance the legis-
lative aim of arbitration. This comment suggests that the solution to this
dilemma is to select arbitrators to serve on regional panels. The members of
the regional arbitrator panels need only be paid when they serve3" 5 and, while
each member would be a public official, he or she would only be called into
service when needed to settle a dispute. By being a resident of, or knowl-
edgeable of the region, the individual members would arguably share the
community's social and economic concerns. Appreciating the needs of the
community, however, only provides for representative panel members. The
next step is to insure that responsible decisions are made. This may be
achieved by requiring the panel members to be, either formally or through
experience, trained in such matters as public finance.31 6 Finally, the ultimate
decisionmaking power must not be removed from the hands of the elector-
ate. However representative or responsible the panel member's decision, the
community should be empowered to reverse it at the polls. While the
serve for four years. If either the city council or the employees are dissatisfied with the decision
of the board, a special election is called and the final decision is thus left with the electorate.
For a discussion of this approach, see UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, LMRS
Newsletter, June 1977, at 2. In San Francisco, California, the voters have by charter amend-
ment, reserved the power to set the salaries for their public employees at the polls. SAN
FRANCISCO, CAL. CHARTER §9.108(b), reprinted in [1977] Gov'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA)
51:1440.
See also SB 164, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, June 22, 1977, which provided for
local option removal of the provision for arbitration. Each community would have been
permitted to render the arbitration law inapplicable by majority vote. Arguably, giving the
people the power to reverse an arbitrator decision is akin to leaving the determination of the
final terms of the agreement in the hands of the local legislators since these legislators are the
representatives of the people and reflect their interests.
315. The approach of paying public officials on an as-needed basis is presently used by the
Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board. The members meet when necessary and are
paid on a per meeting basis. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§140(a), 141(b). The cost of arbitration is
regarded as playing an important role in encouraging bargaining and deterring the excessive use
of the process. See Morris, supra note 2, at 473-74. Typically, state statutes require the parties
to share the cost of arbitration equally. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §7-473c (Supp. 1976); MINN.
STAT. §179.72 (Supp. 1976). In Michigan, the state shares the cost with the parties, MICH. COMP.
LAWS §423.236 (Supp. 1975), and in Alaska, the costs are allocated by the arbitration award,
ALASKA STAT. §09.43.100 (1973). For a discussion and analysis of the procedural costs of public
sector interest arbitration, see Polland, supra note 17, at 53-63.
316. See Grodin, supra note 25, at 18.
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retention of this power in the people is theoretically important, due to the
normally high cost of waging election campaigns, this power is not likely to
be frequently exercised. Thus, the importance of political accountability of
the panel members re-emerges. Unless the panel members are politically
accountable to the community of the region, the community is powerless in
affecting its labor relations destiny. It would appear that the most forthright
manner of affecting political accountability of panel members is for them to
serve for definite terms subject to their removal without cause. If they are
elected, they should be capable of removal by their electorate; and if they
are appointed, by their appointor.
B. "One Person One Vote" Principle
The second problem resulting from making arbitrators public officials
requires a determination of whether arbitrators must be elected or may be
appointed. In Sailors v. Board of Education,311 the United States Supreme
Court faced the issue whether a county board of education may be appointed
rather than elected. To decide this question, the court suggested an im-
portant consideration was the nature of the duties of the board. Noting that
"[v]iable local governments may need many innovations, numerous combi-
nations of old and new devices, great flexibility in muncipal arrangements to
meet changing urban conditions," 318 the Sailors Court refused to decide
whether the state may constitute local governments on an appointive, rather
than elective basis. 319 Since the board of education performed "essentially
administrative functions," 320 rather than legislative duties "in the classical
sense," 321 the Court ruled that the state was permitted to appoint the
members of the board.322 Thus, where an official operates in a nonlegisla-
tive capacity, 323 "a State can appoint local officials or elect them or
combine the elective and appointive systems . ... "324 The Sailors deci-
sion suggests that arbitrators must be elected since their duties involve the
exercise of legislative power.
325
The California Supreme Court faced a related issue in People ex rel.
Younger v. County of El Dorado.326 Noting that the "one person one vote"
principle does not apply when nonlegislative offices are filled by appoint-
ment rather than by election327 and that the Tahoe Regional Planning
317. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
318. Id. at I10-11.
319. Id. at 109-10.
320. Id. at 110. The Court noted that the duties of the board included the "appointment of a
county school superintendent. . . , preparation of an annual budget and levy of taxes. ....
distribution of delinquent taxes . . . , [and the board had] the power to transfer areas from
one school district to another." Id. at 110 n.7.
321. Id. at 110.
322. Id. at 111.
323. Id. at 108.
324. rd. at I1 I.
325. See notes 38 & 245 supra.
326. 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487 P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971).
327. Id. at 505, 487 P.2d at 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
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Agency was clearly engaged in legislative activities, 328 the court was called
upon to decide whether a legislative office may be filled by appointment. 329
The unanimous court reasoned that the administrative-legislative distinction
was unmanageable since "governmental activities 'cannot easily be clas-
sified in the neat categories favored by civics texts' . . ."330 and, conse-
quently, rejected the distinction as "irrelevant." 33I Thus, the Younger
court suggests that whether an official is to be appointed or elected is a
question for the legislature. The resolution of this question by the legislature
involves important public policy considerations. By appointing the arbit-
rator, the legislature may exercise greater control over the qualifications of
the arbitrators than it could if they were elected.
One important consideration in selecting an arbitrator is the individual's
training in such matters as public finance and his or her sensitivity to the
policy issues with which the person can expect to be presented. 332 This
factor militates in favor of selection by appointment. While political accoun-
tability is crucial to preserving the representative character of local govern-
ment, this may be achieved through the appointment of arbitrators by
politically accountable officials. The court concluded that the "one person
one vote" principle would be applied only when the officer is elected. 333 If
he or she is appointed, the "one person one vote" doctrine is inapplic-
able. 334 Thus, if the arbitrator is appointed, the "one person one vote"
principle will not apply.
This comment proposes that regional panels of arbitrators be appointed by
politically accountable officials for definite terms. 335 Each arbitrator could




331. Id. In Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969), the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania dismissed the "one person one vote" argument when it concluded that an
arbitration panel could not be considered legislative when its functions are compared with those
ruled nonlegislative by the Supreme Court in Sailors. Id. at 192, 255 A.2d at 564. See note 299
supra. In Town of Arlington v. Board of Concil. & Arb., - Mass. -, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976),
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussetts reasoned that the arbitration panel is not a unit of
local government and has powers narrower in scope than the powers of the county board in
Sailors. The court concluded that for the "one person one vote" principle to apply, the panel
must exercise "general legislative powers," - Mass. at -, 352 N.E.2d at 920-21.
332. See Grodin, supra note 25, at 17-18.
333. 5 Cal. 3d at 505, 487 P.2d at 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
334. Id.
335. Requiring appointments to be for definite terms, thereby requiring the reappointment
of arbitration board members by elected officials may add political sensitivity to the arbitrator.
336. Selection of the neutral chairman could be done at random or by each party alterna-
tively striking names from a list containing the names of the members of the panel. While the
element of risk may be an important consideration should the propensities of the arbitrators
become known, the element of selection by the parties may be countervailing because it creates
more confidence in the panel. A combination of the alternatives may induce both the desired
conditions. The introduction of uncertainty as to which party's final offer the arbitrator will
select has been recognized as an element contributing to the success of final offer arbitration.
See Morris, supra note 2, at 466-67.
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the deadlocked parties to the dispute. Finally, the mediative benefits
337
inherent in the presence of the partisan arbitrators is an element of the
arbitration process that should not be overlooked.
CONCLUSION
The importance of preserving political accountability for local decision-
making must not be obfiscated by the attractiveness of binding interest
arbitration as a way to avoid public employee strikes. California lawmakers
should not, however, discount arbitration as providing the nucleus for a
resolution that both accomodates the needs of public employees and pre-
serves the representative character of local government. The gravamen of
the solution must be to.integrate the arbitrator into the democratic process by
making him or her politically accountable to the region that is affected by
the bargaining deadlock to be resolved by the arbitral decision. In order to
assure that the arbitrator's decisions are fair, in light of all circumstances,
the legislature should retain control over the qualifications of the members
of the regional arbitrator panels by directing their appointment by politically
accountable officials.
A legislative mandate for compulsory and binding interest arbitration will
encounter three potential problems. Charter cities will seek exemption from
a statewide arbitration law by claiming interference with its municipal
affairs. This claim has merit unless the state limits the application of the
arbitration law to essential employees. This limitation will sufficiently
manifest a statewide concern to outweigh the charter city's constitutionally
rooted power over its municipal affairs. The concern for preserving local
accountability for decisions that affect the locality, from which stems the
municipal affairs doctrine, is however, shared by citizens of both charter
and general law cities. Thus, the second attack to the propriety of the
arbitration law will assert that the arbitration process will result in an
unlawful delegation of legislative power and thereby insulate the govern-
ment from the governed. This argument, which consists of two prongs, will
contend that the legislative decision to mandate arbitration will not meet the
requirement that the fundamental policy determination be made by the
legislature and that there will not be sufficient safeguards to prevent an
abuse of discretion by an arbitrator. This comment discussed, however, the
weakness of the first prong when it is scrutinized in light of the current
judicial climate. Although safeguards present an effective approach to
preserving political accountability for decisionmaking, it eludes application
to the spectrum of issues potentially confronting an arbitrator.
337. See J. STERN, supra note 19, at 124. But see Gallagher, San Bernadino County's
Experiment with Final-Offer, Issue-by-Issue, Advisory Med-Arb, 31 CAL. PuB. EMP. REL. 23
(1976).
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The final attack on the arbitration process will be aimed at the selection
procedure of arbitrators. The claim is that a system that places legislative
power in the hands of private persons results in stripping the people of their
elemental power of referendum and initiative. This assertion strikes at a
judicially honored constitutional nerve, and promises to present a thorny
obstacle in the path of an arbitration law. Thus, this comment concluded that
the proper focus for the drafters of an arbitration law should be on making
arbitrators public officials who are politically accountable. Significantly,
however, this comment noted the inapplicability of the "one person one
vote" principle to the arbitrator selection procedure, which therefore per-
mits arbitrator selection by appointment in California.
An alternative to politically accountable arbitrators, which this comment
considered, is to make the scope of arbitral jurisdiction narrower than the
scope for negotiation in order to leave politically sensitive issues to the
political arena. This alternative was quickly dismissed when it became
apparent that an incongruency of scope would frustrate the legislative
purpose for arbitration. Thus, this comment settled upon an arbitration
procedure aimed at avoiding essential employee strikes through the estab-
lishment of regional panels of politically accountable arbitrators appointed
by elected officials.
California lawmakers are at an important juncture in their formulation of
public sector labor relations policy. While they must be attentive to their
constituent's demand for an effective mechanism to avoid the occurrence of
strikes by essential employees, they must be alert to their responsibility for
the preservation of our democratic form of government. Regional panels of
politically accountable arbitrators presents one solution to a complex politic-
al question of grave social concern. Whatever the solution, while the
California courts are unlikely to frustrate a legislative attempt to satisfy this
concern, it is likely that they will intervene when they sense that the process
is endangering our democratic form of local government.
Gilles Simon Attia
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